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The International Interpretation of the
UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: An
Approach Based on General
Principles
Phanesh Koneru*
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (hereinafter Convention or CISG)' aims
to promote international trade by removing legal barriers in in-
ternational trade.2 The Convention is the culmination of more
than five decades of international efforts to unify the sales law of
international trade,3 and many of its provisions reflect the diffi-
cult negotiations and compromises the drafters had to make.
* J.D., University of San Diego School of Law, 1996; Ph.D., University of
Southern California, 1992. The author is grateful to Professor William H. Law-
rence, University of San Diego School of Law, for his helpful discussions and
encouragement during preparation of this manuscript. However, any errors,
omissions, or misstatements should be attributed to the author alone. This
work is dedicated to Professor Friedhelm Thiedig and his family (Norderstedt,
Germany), Helma and Maximillian R. Meyer (Hamburg, Germany), and Michel
Van der Ginst and his family (Dorp-Zevergem, Belgium).
1. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), re-
printed in S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9, (1983) and 19 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter
CISGI.
2. CISG, supra note 1, preamble.
3. There is extensive literature on the drafting and negotiating history of
the Convention. See generally CESARE M. BIANCA & MICHAEL J. BONNELL, COM-
MENTARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVEN.
TION (1987); JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW
FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES (1989) [hereinafter HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY]; JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES (2d ed.
1991) [hereinafter HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAw]; Gyula E6rosi, A Propos the 1980
Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 31 Am. J.
COMP. L. 333 (1983); Note, Unification and Certainty: The United Nations Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1984
(1984); Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265 (1984); see
also UNILEX, A COMPREHENSIVE AND "INTELLIGENT" DATA BASE ON THE UN
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG),
Transnational Juris Publications, Inc., Irvington, N.Y. [hereinafter UNILEX].
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The integrity of the Convention and its role as an international
body of law to be respected and widely followed depends on how
its various provisions are interpreted by the judiciary in a given
country. 4
To promote uniformity of interpretation, Article 7 of the
Convention itself undertakes the formidable task of guiding
judges. This article is arguably the single most important provi-
sion in ensuring the future success of the Convention.
The general scheme of Article 7 is that the judge should give
an "international" rather than a "domestic" interpretation to the
Convention. Article 7(1) requires that the judge, when inter-
preting any provisions of the Convention, should not, at least
initially, look to any national (domestic) law. Rather, the judge
should focus on the overall objectives of the Convention, namely,
to bring uniformity and to promote the observance of good faith
in international trade. While Article 7(1) describes the goals of
interpretation, Article 7(2) sets out the protocol to achieve these
goals. Article 7(2) requires that the text of the Convention itself
should be the primary source of interpretation. If the text does
not expressly address an issue, the next step is to consult the
"general principles on which the Convention is based." Only if
the answer cannot be found either in the text or in the general
principles of the Convention is the judge free to consult domestic
law as determined by private international law rules.
Part I presents a brief discussion of "international interpre-
tation" under Article 7(1). This discussion suggests that a Euro-
pean model of international interpretation, as developed by the
European Court of Justice, may guide the judiciary in interpret-
ing the Convention. It also argues that international interpreta-
tion can be achieved by focusing on the general principles and
objectives of the Convention. Part II identifies several general
principles contained within the Convention. It argues that the
courts should, consistent with the Article 7(2) methodology, look
to these general principles in resolving specific issues. Part II
also analyzes some of the recent international cases and arbitral
awards interpreting the Convention in terms of their observance
4. Unlike some international agreements and conventions, such as the
Brussels Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, the CISG
does not vest interpretational authority with any international tribunal. There
also is not an editorial board that can regularly meet and amend the Conven-
tion, as is the case with the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States.
Thus, it is crucial that the judge understand his or her role in the interpretation
of the Convention and the lack of any effective short-term "corrective" mecha-
nisms at the international level.
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of Article 7 requirements in resolving various issues, such as in-
terest rate determination and mode of payment.
This article then undertakes further analysis based on gen-
eral principles to address the role of "good faith" and "validity"
in the Convention. Part III demonstrates that the general prin-
ciples underlying many provisions of the Convention collectively
impose an obligation of good faith on the parties. This is a more
expansive role than the limited interpretive function envisioned
by some scholars. In contrast, Part IV suggests that the general
principles of the Convention indicate that the validity exception
should be interpreted narrowly to allow the Convention to have
the widest possible application in international trade. Part IV
further argues that some issues relating to validity of contract
formation such as the issue raised by a missing price term
should be resolved by resorting to the application of many gen-
eral principles discussed in this article, rather than declaring
the contract "invalid." Such an approach based on general prin-
ciples will meet the requirements of Article 7 and fulfill the
objectives of uniformity and certainty in international trade.
I. THE "INTERNATIONAL" INTERPRETATION
"1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international trade."
5
"To read the words of the Convention with regard for their
'international character' requires that they be projected against
an international background."6 Reading the Convention in light
of domestic legal principles would violate the Article 7(1) re-
quirement of having regard to its international character. 7 The
commentary by the UN Secretariat on the 1978 Draft Conven-
tion stated that "[niational rules on the law of sales of goods are
subject to sharp divergencies in approach and concept. Thus, it
is especially important to avoid differing constructions of the
provisions of this Convention by national courts, each dependent
upon the concepts used in the legal system of the country of the
forum."8
5. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7.
6. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAw, supra note 3, § 88(2).
7. Id.
8. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (1979), re-
printed in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 407.
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"The key issue to uniformity... is the degree to which [the
courts] will be guided by foreign decisions."9 The judge is
obliged to consider interpretations of the Convention from other
jurisdictions. 10 However, it is important to recognize that giving
an international interpretation does not mean merely choosing a
domestic interpretation from another country." Even if the do-
mestic law is the same in the countries of the parties, the inter-
pretation as provided by that law may not be the international
interpretation. Nor does choosing the majority rule of the ex-
isting domestic opinions of the world necessarily amount to an
international interpretation. An arbitrator stated that the Con-
vention was silent on the issue of novation and that the issue
can be resolved by looking to the appropriate domestic law. 12
Because the law in all three nations (those of the parties and the
place where dispute arose) was similar with respect to the issue
of novation, the arbitrator applied the "common standard."' 3
This approach equates the international interpretation with the
majority rule among the domestic interpretations of the world
and takes a narrow view of the international scope of the Con-
vention. It fails to recognize that the Convention is not limited
to those three countries whose law was considered, but rather it
applies to all contracting states. A parochial or biased interpre-
tation is a disservice not only to the immediate parties but also
to the international community at large, and such an opinion
should be disregarded at the international level.' 4
9. V. Susanne Cook, Note, The Need for Uniform Interpretation of the
1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 50 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 198 (1988).
10. As Professor Honnold comments, "The Convention's requirement of re-
gard for 'uniformity in its application' calls for tribunals to consider [foreign]
interpretations of the Convention." HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 3,
§ 92(3).
11. For example, assume that a U.S. judge is resolving the issue of accept-
ance under the Convention between Chinese and U.S. parties. If the judge
chooses the Chinese interpretation, she may merely have chosen a Chinese do-
mestic interpretation, and not necessarily an international interpretation.
12. Arbitral Award 7331 (Yugo. v. Italy), ICC Ct. Arb. (1994), 6 ICC INT'L
CT. ARB. BULL. 73 (1995), available in UNILEX, supra note 3. The dispute was
between a seller from the former Yugoslavia and a buyer from Italy over the
sale of cow hides. The seller delivered the goods, but the buyer paid only partial
payment. The parties later renegotiated the mode of payment. The issue was
whether there was a novation. The arbitration was held in Paris. The arbitra-
tor looked to the law of Italy, the former Yugoslavia, and France to resolve the
issue, because the CISG is silent on the issue of novation. Id.
13. Id.
14. "Divergent national interpretations [pose] two distinct difficulties.
First, a lack of information may impose disproportionate costs on certain groups
108 [Vol. 6:105
1997] AN APPROACH BASED ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES 109
The requirement of international interpretation places a
special burden on the judiciary. The judge must not only consult
other international opinions, but also realize that his or her
opinion will be consulted by the judiciary from other jurisdic-
tions for persuasive authority.15 Thus it becomes imperative
that the judge deliver a well-reasoned international interpreta-
tion.16 Because the case law under the Convention is still at a
very early stage of development, it is crucial that present deci-
sions lay the proper foundation for future interpretations to
build upon.
Many scholars agree that an international interpretation
cannot be based on any domestic legal concepts. 17 There has
been less than clear guidance, however, on how to achieve the
international interpretation. The primary reason is that very
few domestic courts ever need to consider foreign interpretations
in their daily business. But the concept of giving an interna-
tional interpretation or an independent meaning is not new to
some judges, especially to the judiciary in the European
Union. 18 As a result, the European model may offer some gui-
dance to domestic courts on how to apply an international inter-
of traders. Second, a lack of any amendment mechanism may leave any diver-
gencies uncorrected, thus undermining the Convention's relevance." Timothy
N. Tuggey, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 540,
555 (1986).
15. One commentator states:
Article 7 envisions deliberation in which courts will treat the deci-
sions of other national courts as significant to their own interpretation
of the Convention. This provision requires courts to pursue uniformity
in the interpretation of the Convention despite th[e] fact that once rati-
fied, the Convention becomes a part of the domestic law of each mem-
ber state.
Amy H. Kastely, Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the
United Nations Sales Convention, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 574, 601 (1988) (cita-
tion omitted).
16. For the criticism that some foreign decisions are short on analysis and
thus are of limited help to other jurisdictions, see Paul Amato, Recent Develop-
ments: CISG, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods -
The Open Price Term and the Uniform Application: An Early Interpretation by
the Hungarian Courts, 13 J.L. & COM. 1, 25-28 (1993).
17. See HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAw, supra note 3, §103.2.
18. The European Union today consists of fifteen Member States: Ger-
many, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Aus-
tria, Italy, Spain, Greece, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, and Portugal.
All members of the European Union are Contracting States to the Brussels
Convention. There are some additional countries, however, that are Con-
tracting States to the Brussels Convention, but are not Member States of the
European Union. See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Busi.
NESS LAw: A GUIDE TO LAw AND PRACTICE, HANDBOOK (1995).
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pretation to legal concepts embedded firmly in many domestic
legal systems.
A. THE EUROPEAN MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL INTERPRETATION:
THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION ON RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
The European Court of Justice (ECJ)19 has been interpret-
ing the Brussels Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments20 for almost two decades and has given many of its
19. The ECJ is a supranational court created under Article 4 of the Treaty
of the European Economic Community. Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The ECJ has thirteen justices and has broad
jurisdiction. Its judgment is binding on all the Member States of Europe. See
generally id. arts. 164-88 (assigning jurisdiction and powers for the ECJ); Foi-
SOM, supra note 18, § 2.10.
20. European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J.
(L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. Some
excellent reviews on this subject include Robert C. Reuland, The Recognition of
Judgments in the European Community: The Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the
Brussels Convention, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 559 (1993); Arthur Taylor von Meh-
ren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on
General Theory and Current Practice in the European Economic Community
and the United States, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1044 (1981); C.G.J. Morse, Interna-
tional Shoe v. Brussels and Lugano: Principles and Pitfalls in the Law of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. Rv. 999 (1995).
The Brussels Convention is a unique body of procedural law that governs
the jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement of judgments in the Community
and ensures free movement of judgments throughout the Community. The
original six members of the European Community - Belgium, West Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands - originally signed the Brus-
sels Convention. As the EC enlarged, new members also joined the Convention.
In 1988, the Community signed an agreement with the Member States of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), known as the Lugano Convention.
The Lugano Convention mirrors the Brussels Convention; it is essentially iden-
tical for the purposes of this article and will not be discussed further. Similarly,
the San Sebastian Convention, which came into force when Spain and Portugal
joined the Community, will not be discussed in this article.
The Brussels Convention has been described as the European equivalent of
the United States Full Faith and Credit Clause. Lee S. Bartlett, Full Faith and
Credit Comes to the Common Market: An Analysis of the Provisions of the Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 44 (1975). The Brussels Convention is not Com-
munity law by its origin. However, negotiations were undertaken pursuant to
article 220 of the EEC Treaty, which provided that "Member States shall...
engage in negotiations with each other with a view to ensuring for the benefit of
their nationals ... the simplification of the formalities governing the reciprocal
recognition and execution of judicial decisions and of arbitral awards." EEC
Treaty, supra note 20, art. 220; see also Reuland, supra, at 560-65 (discussing
the history of the Brussels Convention).
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terms an independent "Community"21 or international meaning
that is not based on the meaning given in a Contracting State.
The ECJ declared as early as 1971, that "the Brussels Conven-
tion must be interpreted having regard both to its principles and
objectives and to its relationship with [Article 220 of the Treaty
of Rome]." 22 The objectives are simplification, uniformity, and
fairness in recognition and enforcement of judgments in all the
Contracting States. 23  Accordingly, in Lufttransportun-
ternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol,24 the ECJ held that
neither the rendering court's nor the enforcing court's interpre-
tation of the phrase "civil and commercial matters" should gov-
ern, but rather that an independent Community definition be
given.25 The Court ruled that "reference must not be made to
the law of one of the States concerned but, first, to the objectives
and scheme of the Convention and, secondly, to the general prin-
ciples which stem from the corpus of the national legal
systems."26
To ensure uniform interpretation of the Brussels Convention, the EEC
Member States signed a Protocol in 1971 conferring jurisdiction on the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. Bartlett, supra, at 59. Article 173 of the EEC Treaty
allows any national court to refer to the European Court of Justice an interpre-
tational question and such interpretation is binding on all the courts of the Eu-
ropean Union. EEC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 177.
21. The term "Community" refers to what is now known as the European
Union.
22. Case 12/76, Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, 1976 E.C.R.
1473, 1484, [19771 1 C.M.L.R. 26, 51 (1977). Article 220 of the EEC Treaty pro-
vides: "Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with
each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals: . . . the
simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards." EEC
Treaty, supra note 20, art. 220.
23. Brussels Convention, supra note 20, pmbl.
24. Case 29/76, Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocon-
trol, 1976 E.C.R. 1541, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 88, 102 (1977).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1552, 1 C.L.M.R. at 101 (emphases added); see also Case 814/79,
The Netherlands State v. Riiffer, 1980 E.C.R. 3807, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R 293
(1981). The Netherlands' government sued the German owner of a wrecked
vessel for costs of recovering the wreckage from a public waterway. Id. at 3818.
The German owner refused to pay, claiming that the Dutch court did not have
jurisdiction, that the Dutch government performed an essentially public ser-
vice, and that the matter was outside the scope of the Convention. The Court
ruled that the agency involved in the removal of the defendant's wrecked vessel
was acting as a public authority under the applicable treaty. The granting of
such authority to the agency is in keeping with the general principles which
stem from the corpus of the national legal systems of the Member States. Id. at
3819, [1981] 3 C.L.M.R. at 313-14. Accordingly, the agency's acts are acts of
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While the ECJ in Eurocontrol did not elaborate on the gen-
eral principles of the Brussels Convention, those principles can
be recognized from the text. For example, Article 2 of the Brus-
sels Convention provides the basic rule that "persons domiciled
in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued
in the courts of that State." This provision reflects the general
principle of fundamental fairness to the defendant.27 But, Arti-
cle 5(1) makes an exception in cases of matters relating to a con-
tract 2s and allows the defendant to be sued in a place other than
its domicile. The Court in Martin Peters Bauunternehmung
GmbH v. Zuid Nederlandse Aanemers Vereniging,29 gave an in-
dependent meaning to the term "matters relating to a contract"
to include relations between a trade association and its mem-
bers.30 The Court stated that the membership of an association
creates between the members close links of the same kind as
those which are created between the parties to a contract. 31 Be-
cause of such close links, "it should be possible for all the diffi-
culties which may arise on the occasion of the performance of the
contract to be brought before the same court."3 2 Thus, the Court
gave primacy to the general principle of judicial efficiency over
the Article 2 principle of fairness to the defendant by granting
an independent meaning to a key provision of the Brussels Con-
vention. Such an independent meaning ensures "equality and
uniformity of the rights and obligations arising out of the [Brus-
exercising public authority and thus are not within the scope of Article 1 of the
Convention. Id.
27. Article 6 of the Brussels Convention is the counter-provision address-
ing fairness to the plaintiffs. It provides that in a case with multiple defend-
ants, all of them may be sued in a jurisdiction in which any of them is
domiciled. Brussels Convention, supra note 20, art. 6(1).
28. Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention provides: "A defendant domi-
ciled in a Contracting State may be sued in another Contracting State... in
contract matters, before the courts of the place where the contract was or is to
be performed." Id. art. 5(1).
29. Case 34/82, Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v. Zuid
Nederlanse Aanemers Vereniging, 1983 E.C.R. 987, 1002, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R.
605 (1984).
30. Id. A Dutch trade association sued one of its member companies, a
German company, for the sums owed under the association's internal rules.
The issue was whether the matter was related to a contract. If so, then under
the Brussels Convention the Dutch courts will have jurisdiction, because the
place of performance is the Netherlands where the trade association has its
seat. Id. at 1001.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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sels] Convention for the Contracting States and the persons
concerned."33
On the other hand, even an exclusive jurisdiction based on
property should not prevail if it does not serve the objectives of
the Convention. For example, Article 16(1) provides that the
courts where immovable property is situated shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction in cases involving in rem rights or tenancies in
such immovable property, regardless of the domicile of the de-
fendant.34 This exclusive jurisdiction is clearly meant to facili-
tate judgment by the judiciary most intimately familiar with the
applicable property law.35 In Hacker v. Euro-Relais GmbH, the
tenancy agreement in dispute involved a German traveler and a
German travel agency that arranged for the traveler to rent a
cottage, in the Netherlands for a short term.36 The defendant
also agreed to provide a number of services to the plaintiff. The
ECJ held that the term "tenancy" should be construed narrowly
("must not be given a wider interpretation than is required by
[its] objective") and that it cannot include providing additional
services. 37 Interpreting the term more broadly than the facts
required (in this case to include an agreement where none of the
parties is the owner of the leased property) would deprive the
parties of the domestic forum, because they would be brought
before a Dutch court.38 The Court implied that exceptions to the
Convention's basic rule of choice of forum to the parties should
not be granted lightly.
33. Id.
34. "The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of
domicile: ... in matters involving rights in rem in real property or concerning
the leasing of real property: ... the courts of the Contracting State in which the
real property is located." Brussels Convention, supra note 20, art. 16(1).
35. See Case 241/83, R~sler v. Rottwinkel 1985 E.C.R. 99, 126, [1985] 1
C.L.M.R. 809 (1985), explaining that the logic behind Article 16(1) was that
since leases are so closely related to the law of real property, courts in the juris-
diction where the property in question is located will be most competent to de-
cide lease disputes. See also, Case 158/87, Scherrens v. Maenhout, 1988 E.C.R.
3791, 3804, [1990] 2 CEC (CCH) 8, 16 (1990), in which the court, relying on
Rosler's statement of the reasoning behind article 16(1), decided that in a dis-
pute over leased land situated partly in Belgium and partly in the Netherlands,
both the Belgian and Dutch courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the property
located within their respective borders.
36. Case C-280/90, Hacker v. Euro-Relais GmbH, 1992 E.C.R. 1-1111, I-
1124, [1994] 1 CEC (CCH) 102, 114 (1994).
37. Id. at 1-1132, [1994] 1 CEC (CCH), at 116.
38. Id.
113
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The ECJ interpreted many other concepts of the Brussels
Convention consistently with the ruling in Eurocontrol.39 This
remarkably heightened awareness and consistency displayed by
the ECJ is probably the reason for the success of the Brussels
Convention in Europe. The Court correctly focused on the objec-
tives and principles of the Brussels Convention and interpreted
its terms either narrowly or broadly, for the sole purpose of ef-
fectuating those objectives and principles. When there is ten-
sion between two principles, as in the case of Article 16(1)
exclusive jurisdiction and the basic jurisdiction of Article 2, the
Court again resolved the issue by focusing on the objectives of
the Brussels Convention.
By analogy,40 the Article 7(2) approach to interpretation of
CISG also requires that the general principles of the Convention
guide its proper interpretation.
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the gen-
eral principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles,
39. Case 21/76, Bier v. Mines de Potasse D'Alsace, 1976 E.C.R. 1735,
[1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 284 (1977) (construing Article 5(3)'s reference to "the place
where the injury occurred"); Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. HEMA 1988 E.C.R. 5565,
[19901 2 CEC (CCH) 22 (1990) (construing reference to "tort or quasi-torts," Ar-
ticle 5(3)); Case 150/77 Bertrand v. Ott, 1978 E.C.R. 1431, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R.
499 (1978) (construing "installment contracts for the purchase of personal prop-
erty or... installment loans to finance the purchase of such property," Article
13); Case 33/78, Somafer v. Saar-Ferngas, 1978 E.C.R. 2183, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R.
490 (1979) and Case 139/80 Blanckaert & Willems v. Trost, 1981 E.C.R. 819,
[1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 1 (both construing "operation of a branch, agency, or other
establishment," Article 5(5)).
In Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn plc v. Petereit, 1992 E.C.R. 1-1745,
[1994] 1 CEC (CCH) 293 (1994) a German court requested that the ECJ inter-
pret Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. Article 17 confers exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the court of a Contracting State if one or more parties is domiciled in a
Contracting State and all have agreed to that effect. The Court found that the
relationship between a company and its shareholders is a "close link" which
justifies treating them as parties to a contract, and therefore Article 17 makes
enforceable their agreement to bring disputes before a specified court. Id. at I-
1774, [1994] 1 CEC (CCH) at 315. It warned that "[a]ny other interpretation of
art. 17 of the Brussels Convention would lead to a multiplication of the heads of
jurisdiction for disputes arising from the same legal and factual relationship
between the company and its shareholders and would run counter to the princi-
ple of legal certainty." Id. at 1-1775, [1994] 1 CEC (CCH) at 315.
40. It can be argued that, because the Brussels Convention is a procedural
body of law and that the CISG is a body of substantive law, the Brussels Con-
vention cannot be a suitable model to follow, but this is merely arguing form
over substance. The essence of the model is to identify the principles and objec-
tives of the Convention and adopt an interpretation that best serves those prin-
ciples and objectives.
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in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law.
4 1
Because the general principles of the Convention represent
the "common ground" on which the international delegates un-
derstood each other and agreed to join together in formulating
the Convention, interpretations based on the general principles
are least likely to be labeled as domestic or parochial and are
most likely to represent the spirit of international cooperation
and understanding behind the Convention. The success of the
European model shows that such an approach based on general
principles is not only feasible but also should be practiced in the
arena of international trade.
The approach based on general principles serves the objec-
tives of the Convention more fully because sometimes the text
may have failed to express clearly the objectives of the Conven-
tion. For example, the role of good faith as expressed in Article
7(1) does not seem to convey its intended role as being strictly
limited to the interpretation only.42 Similarly, the legislative
history is often inconclusive and offers limited guidance in an-
swering specific issues. 43 In these cases, the general principles
offer a more reliable indication of the objectives of the Conven-
tion. Given that the CISG does not have any provision for a cen-
tralized interpreting authority, it becomes imperative that the
judiciary has a thorough understanding of the general principles
of the Convention.
II. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE
CONVENTION IS BASED
Article 7(2) of CISG requires courts to consult the general
principles of the Convention before they apply domestic law.
The Convention, however, does not explicitly state what those
general principles are.44 Some members objected to the general
principles approach because "it is difficult or impossible to iden-
41. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7.
42. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
43. For example, on the issue of determining interest rates, the Conven-
tion's legislative history shows that the delegates could not agree on any
formula. Inconclusive debates such as this offer little guidance to a judge facing
ambiguous provisions. See infra notes 85-128 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing interest rates).
44. The concept of relying on the general principles of the Convention
caused some debate among the members of the Working Group at their first
session in 1970. Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of
Goods, 1st Sess., 56-72, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/35 (1970) [hereinafter Working
Group I], reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 19-21.
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tify those general principles."45 Supporters of retention of the
reference to general principles argued that one of the sources for
these principles would be the generalizations that could be made
from the various specific provisions of the text;46 another source
would be the "course of evolution of the Law." 47 The purpose is
to provide the judge with some guidance rather than "to leave
the matter in complete uncertainty," which could result in
judges being "free to apply national law whenever a question
[was] not expressly settled by the Uniform Law."48 Otherwise, it
would be "an invitation to disregard [the Convention] for those
who would wish to avoid its application."49
While the Convention does not list the general principles on
which it is based, it is possible to discern a number of those prin-
ciples from the text of the Convention and from its legislative
history.50 In identifying those general principles, it should be
kept in mind that the Convention's overall objective is to pro-
mote international trade by removing legal barriers that arise
from different social, economic, and legal systems of the world. 51
The general principles provision can have the narrow effect of
"guarding against the use of local (and divergent) legal concepts
in construing the specific provisions" or the broader effect of "au-
thorizing tribunals to create new rules not directly based on the
[textual] provisions."5 2 As in many commentaries in the past,5 3
45. Id. 57, reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3,
at 20.
46. "The general principles ... are the general ideas which inspired the
Uniform Law." Id.
47. Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, 2d
Sess., 132, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/52 (1970), reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 3, at 68.
48. Id.
49. Working Group 1, supra note 44, 69, reprinted in HONNOLD, Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 21 (emphasis added).
50. In debates over the drafting of the Convention, some delegates pointed
out that the general principles of ULIS (the Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods, which preceded the CISG) are apparent in the provisions of ULIS
and its legislative history. Id. 59, reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY, supra note 3, at 21.
51. The Convention states:
Considering that the development of international trade on the basis of
equality and mutual benefit is an important element in promoting
friendly relations among States, [and] being of the opinion that the
adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for the international
sale of goods and take into account the different social, economic and
legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in inter-
national trade and promote the development of international trade.
CISG, supra note 1, pmbl.
52. Id.
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the present purpose in identifying and extracting many of the
general principles is to help produce at least the narrow effect of
preventing interpretations of the Convention based on domestic
law. The broader effect of creating a jus commune5 4 can take
place on these foundations in the distant future.
An important general principle that has been explicitly
stated in the Convention itself is the parties' freedom of con-
tract.55 "[V]irtually all of the provisions [Articles 1-88 of the
Convention] yield to the contract made by the seller and buyer;
in short, the heart of the Sales Convention is the contract of
sale."5 6 The general principle of timely communication among
the parties whenever that communication is important to the af-
fected party is pervasive among the many provisions of the Con-
vention.5 7 For example, Article 18(1) states that silence is not
53. See generally HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 3, §§ 99-101, 101
n.39, 150, 177.
54. Jus commune means "[in the Civil law, common right; the common
and natural rule of right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 859 (6th ed. 1990). This
contrasts withjus singulare, "a peculiar or individual rule... established for
some special reason." Id. at 862-63.
55. "The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, ....
derogate or vary the effect of any of its provisions." CISG, supra note 1, art. 6.
56. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAw, supra note 3, § 103.
57. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 18(1) (stating "silence or inactivity does
not in itself amount to acceptance."); 18(2) ("An acceptance is not effective if the
indication of assent does not reach the offeror within the [appropriate time]");
19(2) (requiring the offeror to communicate his objections to the offeree who
accepts with terms that are additional or different but not materially so); 21(2)
(providing late acceptance is binding unless the offeror informs the offeree
otherwise "without delay"); 26 (stating "a declaration of avoidance of the con-
tract is effective only if made by notice to the other party."); 32(3) (requiring
seller to provide insurance information to buyer if buyer so requests); 39 (stat-
ing "the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he
does not give notice to the seller ... within a reasonable time"); 43 (providing
buyer loses the right to rely on seller's warranties as provided in Articles 41 or
42, if he does not give notice to the seller within a reasonable time after becom-
ing aware of the third party's claims to the goods); 46 (requiring buyer to give
notice to the seller if the buyer wants substitute goods or the repair of the goods
already delivered); 47(2) (prohibiting buyer from resorting to any remedy for
the breach of contract during the time period reserved for performance of the
contract unless he receives a notice of the seller's impending non-performance);
48(2) (stating "if the seller requests the buyer to make known whether he will
accept performance and the buyer does not comply with the request within a
reasonable time, the seller may perform within the time indicated in his re-
quest. The buyer may not, during that period of time, resort to any remedy
which is inconsistent with performance by the seller."); 68 (placing the risk of
loss on the seller if the seller knew that the goods have been lost or destroyed
already and does not notify the buyer); 71(3) (requiring that in anticipatory
breach situations, the party suspending performance must notify the other
party of his suspension); 72(2) (providing that a party intending to declare the
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communication of an acceptance. Article 26 provides that a
party cannot avoid the contract unless a declaration of avoid-
ance of contract is communicated to the other party. A buyer's
right to demand that the product conform to the contract is lost
under Article 39 if the buyer does not notify the seller in a rea-
sonable time. Article 72(2) requires a party to give reasonable
notice if it wants to declare the contract avoided. The Conven-
tion requires these important messages to be communicated
promptly so that the affected party can take the necessary meas-
ures to protect its interests. Not only must the communication
be timely, but it also must disclose relevant information to avoid
any surprises.58
An important aspect of international trade is that, in prac-
tice, the parties heavily rely on reasonable conduct by the other
party. Many provisions of the Convention are aimed at protect-
ing such reasonable reliance of the parties.5 9 Article 16(2)(b) is
contract avoided must give reasonable notice to the other party); 79(4) (requir-
ing a party that fails to perform to give notice of the impediments to its per-
formance to avoid being held liable to the other party for its non-performance);
88(1) (stating that to the extent possible, the party preserving the goods must
notify the other party of his intention to sell them).
58. See e.g., id. arts. 1(2) (stating "the fact that the parties have their
places of business in different States is to be disregarded whenever this fact
does not appear either from the contract or from any dealings between, or from
information disclosed by the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of
the contract."); 2(a) (stating the "Convention does not apply to sales of goods
bought for personal, family, or household use, unless the seller, at any time
before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have
known that the goods were bought for any such use.") (emphasis added).
59. See id. arts. 9(1) (stating "any practices which [the parties] have estab-
lished between themselves" must be honored); 10(a) (providing that when defin-
ing a party's place of business, regard is to be had "to the circumstances known
to or contemplated by the parties"); 14(2) (explaining that a proposal is merely
an invitation to make offers, "unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the
person making the proposal"); 16(2)(b) (stating an offer is irrevocable "if it was
reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree
has acted in reliance on the offer"); 27 (providing that it is reasonable to rely on
appropriate methods of communication); 29(2) (precluding a party from assert-
ing that a written agreement cannot be modified orally if his conduct induced
the other party to rely on an oral modification); 35(2)(b) (providing that the war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose should apply unless the buyer did not
rely on seller's skill and judgment); 48(2) (stating that a seller who relies on
buyer's "acquiescence" to imperfect perfomance is protected, and the buyer may
not "resort to any remedy which is inconsistent with performance by the
seller"); 49(2) (protecting the seller by requiring that the buyer act within a
reasonable time to declare the contract avoided); 63 (preventing the seller from
resorting to any remedy during the time period in which he gives the buyer
additional time to perform); 79(4) (allowing one party to collect damages if the
other party fails to perform and does not give timely notice); 80 (stating "[a]
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a prime example, as it makes an offer irrevocable when the of-
feree acts in reasonable reliance. 60 Article 8 expressly encour-
ages and sets forth the standards to be used in interpreting the
parties' conduct and binds the parties to any such usages, in-
cluding any subsequent conduct that promotes reliance by the
other party.61 Thus the Convention actively encourages the par-
ties to communicate, contract and thus distribute the risks as
they see fit. The overarching principle of contractual freedom
under Article 6 allows maximum flexibility for the parties.
Once the parties reach an agreement, however, the distribu-
tion of risk is, for the most part, fixed. This general principle of
freezing the distribution of risk can be recognized from the ex-
pression "at the of conclusion of the contract" present in many
provisions of the Convention.62 The Convention itself provides
an exception to this general principle in Article 29(1), which al-
lows a contract to be modified or terminated without any further
consideration. But, such modification or termination is subject
to the agreement of the parties, which agreement takes into ac-
count the general principles of communication and respect for
protection of each other's interests. The general principles of
party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to the extent that
such failure was caused by the first party's act or omission").
60. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 16(2)(b).
61. See id. art. 8.
62. See id. arts. 10(a) (providing that the parties' place of business are de-
termined at conclusion of the contract); 31(b), (c) (fixing the place of delivery as
the place where the parties knew the goods were at the time of conclusion of the
contract or the seller's place of business); 42(1) (stating that liability for selling
goods which are subject to industrial property rights depends on the seller's
knowledge at the time of conclusion of the contract); 42(2) (providing that the
seller is not liable for any infringement of industrial property rights if the buyer
knew of a third-party claim at the time of the conclusion of the contract); 55
(providing that an open price term is to be determined by the price generally
charged for similar goods at the time of the conclusion of the contract); 68 (plac-
ing the risk of loss of goods sold in transit on the buyer from the time of the
conclusion of the contract, but on the seller if the seller knew, at that point, that
the goods had been lost or damaged, but did not tell the buyer of such loss or
damage); 73(2) (providing that the buyer in an installment sale may declare the
contract void with respect to past and future deliveries if, by reason of their
interdependence, those deliveries could not be used for the purpose contem-
plated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract); 74 (stating
that consequential damages are not recoverable if those damages are not fore-
seeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract); 79(1) (stating that a party
is not liable for failure to perform any of his obligations if the failure was due to
an "impediment beyond his control" and such impediment was unforeseeable at
the time of the conclusion of the contract).
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good faith and reasonable behavior are also evident from the
text of the Convention. 63
The general principle of protecting restitution,64 reliance,65
and expectation6 6 interests of the aggrieved party is evident
from the text of the Convention. The duty to mitigate the dam-
ages or losses is another general principle.67 One court ex-
tracted the general principle that the burden of proof with
respect to lack of conformity of goods is on the buyer.68 Simi-
larly, one court stated that Article 57(1)(a) represents the gen-
eral principle that obligation to pay is to be performed at the
place of business of the creditor.69
63. See infra notes 146-57 (discussing good faith as a general principle).
64. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 81(2) (allowing restitution for partial per-
formance); 82 (stating buyer can only avoid a contract as long as it is possible
for him to make restitution); 84 (requiring seller to account for benefits received
when restitution is due).
65. Id. arts. 85, 86(1), 88(3) (providing that a party that preserves goods is
entitled to reasonable expenses).
66. Many provisions directly or indirectly support this principle. See, e.g.,
id. arts. 45(2) (stating "the buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to
claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies"); 47(2), 48(1) (provid-
ing that the buyer is not deprived of any right to claim damages for delay in
performance or for allowing the seller to cure afer the delivery date); see also
id. arts. 61(2), 63(2), 65(1) (listing analagous provisions for the seller); 79(5),
81(1) (preserving either party's right to claim other damages or rights); 78 (pro-
viding for interest on any sum "that is in arrears" from the other party, "with-
out prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under article 74").
67. See, e.g., id. arts. 77 (stating that the seller "must take such measures
as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of
profit"); 85, 86(1) (setting out the duty to preserve goods); 88(2) (setting out the
duty to take reasonable measures to sell the rapidly deteriorating goods).
68. Case HG930138 U/H93, (Italy v. Switz.), Handelsgericht Ziirich (Sept.
9, 1993) (unpublished), available in UNILEX, supra note 3. The court held that
the general scheme of the Articles 38 and 39 reflects the general principle of
burden of proof with respect to lack of conformity of goods delivered. Id. But
see Arbitral Award 6653 (Fr. V. Syria), ICC Ct. Arb. (Feb. 7, 1993), reprinted in
A.H. KRITzER, 2 GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, (supp. 2
1994), available in UNILEX, supra note 3. The court stated that even though
"Articles 35 and 36 provide for a unified notion of non-conformity, unlike the
French domestic law which distinguishes between non-conformity and defects,"
the question of burden of proving non-conformity is not addressed in the CISG
and should be resolved according to the French law. Id.
69. Case 17 U 73/93 (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Oberlandesgericht Diisseldorf (July 2,
1993) RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT (RIW) 845 (1993), translated
in A.H. KRITZER, 2 GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (supp. 9
1994), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
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The ultimate unifying general principle of the Convention is
probably the principle of preservation of the contract. 70 The var-
ious gap-filling provisions of the Convention, including Article 7,
are all geared to accomplish this objective. 7 1 The notice require-
ments of the Convention supplement these provisions in effec-
tively preserving the contract. 72
While many general principles of the Convention can be ex-
tracted from the text alone, several courts have stated, without
engaging in much analysis, that there are no general principles
addressing a specific issue. 73 At least one commentator has ar-
gued that Article 7(2) "admits the possibility that there actually
are [no] general principles underlying the Convention, or at
least that the principles are not comprehensive." 74 Both of these
readings take an unjustifiably narrow view of the nature and
role of the Convention. The Convention was drafted in an at-
mosphere of compromise to find a reasonably workable solution
and is not meant to be an exhaustive codification of interna-
tional commercial behavior. Such codification would have been
unrealistic and would make the Convention too inflexible to
adapt to changing circumstances of international trade.
It has been suggested that one should exercise restraint in
extracting the general principles. Professor Honnold recom-
mends that such findings of general principles should be limited
to situations where the general principles are "moored to prem-
ises that underlie specific provisions of the Convention."75 He
70. See HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAw, supra note 3, § 101(c) n.39.
71. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 8(3) (stating "due consideration is to be given
to all relevant circumstances of the case, including... any subsequent conduct
of the parties"); 9(2) (providing that the parties are impliedly bound to any us-
age they ought to have known); 11 (providing that there is no need for a written
contract; its existence can be proved by any means); 14 (1) (stating an offer "is
sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods.., quantity and the price"); 18(3)
(allowing acceptance by performance); 21(2) (providing that an acceptance is
effective if dispatched in time but gets to the offeror late); 23 (stating "[a] con-
tract is concluded at the moment when an acceptance of an offer becomes effec-
tive"); 25 (stating that a breach is not fundamental if it was not reasonably
foreseeable); 26 (requiring notice to avoid the contract); 29(1) (stating "a con-
tract may be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of the parties"); 31-
34 (listing gap-filling provisions as to the delivery of the goods or transfer of
documents); 47(1), 48 (listing provisions to permit the buyer to allow the seller
more time to perform); 55, 57, 58 (listing gap-filling provisions that fix the price,
place of payment, and time of payment, respectively); 63(1) (allowing seller to
fix additional reasonable time for the buyer to perform).
72. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 85-128 and accompanying text.
74. Kastely, supra note 16, at 606.
75. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAw, supra note 3, § 102.
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further suggests that finding general principles to solve a spe-
cific problem is valid only when the lack of a specific provision to
govern the issue is due to deliberate rejection by the delegates to
the Convention or due to the Convention's "failure to anticipate
and resolve [the] issue."76 If the Convention failed to anticipate
and thus provide for a specific solution to an issue, an analogical
extension from the existing provisions to the new situation is
then appropriate. 77
Thus, any issue that has not been expressly excluded by the
Convention, 78 and which can be resolved by applying the gen-
eral principles of the Convention, should be solved accordingly.
In reaching a solution, the legislative history controls only to the
extent of identifying a general principle, determining that the
issue was not impliedly excluded from the Convention, or ascer-
taining whether the issue was anticipated. 79 This formulation is
preferable because it provides "a generous response to the invi-
tation of Article 7(2) to develop the Convention through the 'gen-
eral principles on which it is based.' 8 0 A faithful application of
Article 7 requires this approach. Such faithful application is re-
quired of judges in applying the Convention because, by voting
for Article 7(2), the delegates agreed to deny reference to domes-
tic law except as a last resort for the sake of any "uniformity" the
domestic law may bring.8 '
76. Id. "The language of Article 7(2) reflects the decision to narrow the
scope of ULIS 17... which authorized tribunals to find (or create) general prin-
ciples to settle every problem that is not governed expressly by the Convention."
Id.
77. Id.
78. Various alternatives discussed at the Convention included assigning
the interest rate at the seller's place or at the buyer's place or the higher of
either place. The "prevailing" rate could be either the statutory rate or the com-
mercial short term discount rate. Some delegates favored adding a penalty of
one per cent to whatever the rate to be agreed upon. Other suggestions were to
tie the rate to the currency of payment or base it on international markets. The
issue remained unresolved throughout the Convention and the final text
emerged without any solution.
79. Article 7(2) provides that "[q]uestions concerning matters governed by
this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in con-
formity with the general principles on which it is based" CISG, supra note 1,
art. 7(2); see generally infra notes 85-128 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, arts. 2-5.
81. The legislative material "may be indecisive but it can reveal the objec-
tive of a provision and thereby help in coping with novel situations where the
statutory text is unclear." John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action-Uni-
form International Words: Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 209 (1988).
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Without this safety net of general principles,8 2 the rules of
interpretation become simple: apply the domestic law whenever
the Convention has not expressly provided for the resolution of
an issue. Such a simple solution would severely undercut the
effectiveness of the Convention because many issues of practical
importance to international trade have not been expressly re-
solved by the Convention, even though they were discussed. A
prime example is the payment of prejudgment interest, where
the Convention has discussed but has not expressly provided for
a method of determining the interest rate. As the following dis-
cussion illustrates, this contentious issue can be resolved by fo-
cusing on the objective and general principles of the Convention.
A. RATE OF INTEREST PAYMENTS
Some of the thorny issues that confront judges are those
that have been specifically debated at the Convention but could
not be agreed upon. A specific example is the issue of interest
payments. The Convention expressly provides in Article 78 that
interest is due on payments in arrears. As the legislative his-
tory nevertheless shows, the delegates could not agree on the
rate of interest or the time for accrual of the interest payment.83
Should a court deciding these issues consider the matter as hav-
ing been deliberately rejected at the Convention and resort to
the appropriate domestic law? The answer should be no because
the issue of interest payment is not excluded from the Conven-
tion (matter governed by the Convention), but rather the
mechanics of accomplishing it is not expressly settled. Accord-
ingly, Article 7(2) requires resort to general principles in resolv-
ing the issue.84
Interest payment is considered to be part of the damages in
some countries, whereas it is completely excluded in other coun-
tries.8 5 The Convention expressly provides in Article 78 that the
82. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 3, § 102.
83. The delegates "wished to free judges from having to look to national
law for [solving interpretational questions and gaps], an avenue that would
lead to disunity." Working Group 1, supra note 44, 59, reprinted in HONNOLD,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 20.
84. The importance of the general principles in the success of the Conven-
tion cannot be overstated. One needs to recognize that the text of the Conven-
tion is incapable of adapting to various fact patterns that may emerge in the
future and may threaten the success of the Convention. The concept of general
principles is a flexible concept that can address the future needs of the
Convention.
85. Even though the Convention clearly provides for interest in an Article
separate from the description of general damages, some courts still consider the
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creditor is to be paid interest on any payments in arrears.8 6 The
Convention, however, is silent on the rate of interest that should
be calculated. Consequently, as indicated by the growing case
law, Article 78 has become the focus of substantial controversy
under the Convention.8 7 The controversy has its origins in the
legislative history of the CISG itself.88
interest to be part of the damages. See, e.g., Arbitral Award 7531 (Aus. V.
P.R.C.), ICC Ct. Arb. (1994), 6 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 67 (1995), available in
UNILEX, supra note 3 (explaining that interest is an element of damages under
Article 74). In some Moslem countries it is forbidden to charge interest. See
Deliberations of the First Committee of the Convention on Contracts for Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 34th mtg., 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.34 (1980)
[hereinafter U.N. Meeting 34], reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 3, at 647; Franco Ferrari, Uniform Application and Interest Rates
Under The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, 24 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 467, 478
n.63 (1995).
86. "If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the
other party is entitled to interest on it, without prejudice to any claim for dam-
ages recoverable under article 74." CISG, supra note 1, art. 78.
87. Approximately more than 70% of the cases compiled by UNILEX dis-
cuss the issue of interest rate. UNILEX, supra note 3. "More than any other
provision in the Convention, article 78 was affected by the diverse traditions of
its drafters. Interest is treated differently in countries with different economic
systems-the distinction is greatest between capitalist and socialist countries-
and is barred by religious rules existing in some countries." Jeffrey S. Sutton,
Measuring Damages Under the United Nations Convention on the International
Sale of Goods, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 737, 749 (1989) (citation omitted).
88. The origins of Article 78 can be traced at least to Article 83 of ULIS,
which provided that the seller shall be allowed an interest rate equal to the
official discount rate in his place of business plus 1 per cent. Report of the Work-
ing Group on the International Sale of Goods, 5th Sess., 166, U.N. Doc. Al
CN.9/87 (1984), reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at
190; Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods,
July 1, 1964, with Annex, Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods,
1972, 834 U.N.T.S. 109 (entered into force Aug. 18, 1972), reprinted in 13 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 453 (1964). This provision was then amended to state that the seller
is entitled to a rate of interest that is no lower than the rate charged for un-
secured short-term commercial loans in seller's place of business. Report of the
Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, 6th Sess., '1 115, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/100 (1975), reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
3, at 253. The objective was to prevent buyers from holding off on payments if
the statutory interest rate is lower than what the seller actually pays. Id.
Additional proposals included first, tying the interest rate to that prevail-
ing at the buyer's place of business, and second, outright deletion of the provi-
sion, on the grounds that some countries disallow any charging of interest.
Report of Committee of the Whole I Relating to the Draft Convention on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods, 492-500, U.N. Doc. A/32/17, Annex I (1977), re-
printed in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 353. But later, a
Swedish representative pointed out that interest on arrears was acceptable
even in countries that prohibited charging interest outright. Deliberations of
the First Committee of the Convention on Contracts for International Sale of
Goods, 29th mtg., 91 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.29 (1980) [hereinafter U.N.
1997] AN APPROACH BASED ON GEvERAL PRm'cIPL~s 125
Some commentators argue that, because the interest rate is
not fixed by the Convention, it is outside the scope of the Con-
vention and thus it should be determined by the appropriate
domestic law. 89 This interpretation results from a misunder-
standing of the overall scheme of the Convention, as well as the
express provisions of Article 7(2) and the general principles on
which the Convention is based. The Convention provides in Ar-
ticle 7(2) that matters governed by the Convention but which
are not expressly settled in it should be settled in conformity
with the general principles on which it is based. It is beyond
dispute that payment of interest is a matter governed by the
Convention: the principle is codified in Article 78. But the mat-
ter of how the rate should be determined is not expressly settled
in the Convention. The determination of interest rate seems to
be an ideal example for the application of Article 7(2)
methodology.
The general principle that is abundantly clear in relation to
the payment of price and a failure to comply is to compensate
the aggrieved party fully in order to restore the benefit of the
Meeting 29], reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at
610. Some delegations also preferred that a clear statement be adopted in the
Convention rather than leaving the issue to the national laws. Id. 1-43, re-
printed in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 609-13. The U.S.
delegation commented that since the purpose of the provision was to compen-
sate the plaintiff and he would more likely have lost the use of his money in his
own place of business, the interest rate should be the rate prevailing in his
place of business. Id. 30, reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 3, at 612. The Indian delegation suggested that the rate should be
the higher of the rates at the buyer's and seller's place of business, and that it
be due from the date payment should have been made and tied to the currency
in which the payment is due. Id. 18, reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 3, at 611. The East German delegation argued that the
interest rate should be that prevailing in the international markets. U.N.
Meeting 34, supra note 85, 6, reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 3, at 637. At some point the Article even was split into two parts.
Draft Articles of the Convention Submitted to the Plenary Conference by the
First Committee of the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, pt. III, ch. V, sec. II, art. 73 bis, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/llfAdd. 1 and 2
(1980), reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 722.
But later, at the 11th plenary meeting, the Article was adopted in its present
form. Report of the First Committee to the Plenary Conference, 11th plen. mtg.,
4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/SR.11 (1980), reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 3, at 761.
89. See generally Ferrari, supra note 85, at 475-76 (citing many authorities
that argue that the rate of interest is to be determined by applicable domestic
law); see also Eva Diederichsen, Commentary to Journal of Law & Commerce
Case I: Oberlandesgericht, Frankfurt am Main, 14 J.L. & COM. 177, 180-81
(1995) (arguing that the common German practice of relying on domestic law to
determine the interest rate is "the only possibility in practice").
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bargain. 90 In addition, the aggrieved party can recover addi-
tional expenses incurred such as transportation costs, among
others, because the aggrieved party's "loss" includes not only the
lost profits and other damages but also any interest it could have
earned had the defaulting party paid promptly.91 While in some
countries interest is not considered part of damages, 92 the Con-
vention obviates any such discussion by expressly providing for
it in Article 78, emphasized by the phrase "without prejudice to
any claim for damages recoverable under Article 74."93 Thus, it
is irrelevant whether interest is considered part of damages be-
cause the general principle of full compensation compels that in-
terest should be paid on all amounts due.94
If the mandate of Article 7(2) is followed, it also becomes
apparent that the various formulations of calculating the inter-
est rate may be unnecessary. By focusing on the full-compensa-
tion objective of the Convention, the inquiry should be which
interest rate will fully compensate the aggrieved party. It has
been argued that the aggrieved party should be awarded inter-
est payments at the rate based on the aggrieved party's credit
costs. 95 Such a solution is "best suited to international trade
where it is not the practice for the business person to leave their
money idle."9 6
90. "The seller is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages
by exercising his right to other remedies." CISG, supra note 1, art. 61(2). Also,
even if interest is not defined as part of damages, Article 78 specifically provides
for interest "without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under arti-
cle 74." Id. art. 78.
91. Some commentators criticize this view for the reason that it leads to
blurring the line between damages and interests, which article 78 was intended
to draw. Ferrari, supra note 85, at 476 n.55. But the issue of whether the inter-
est is part of the damages or separate from the damages is irrelevant, because
the Convention expressly provides that the interest should be awarded regard-
less of how it is classified. CISG, supra note 1, art. 78.
92. See U.N. Meeting 34, supra note 85, 9, reprinted in HONNOLD, Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 637 (remarks of Mr. Klingsporn, Delegate
from Feceral Republic of Germany).
93. CISG, supra note 1, art. 78.
94. In one European case construing the CISG, "the arbitrator found that
full compensation is one of the general principles underlying CISG." Arbitral
Award SCH-4366, (Aus. v. F.R.G.), Internationales Schiedsgericht der
Bundeskammer der Gewerblichen Wirtschaft (June 15, 1994) (abstract), RECHT
DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTscHAFTr (RIW) 590-91 (1995), available in UNILEX,
supra note 3.
95. U.N. Meeting 29, supra note 88, 30, reprinted in HONNOLD, DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 612 (remarks of Mr. Farnsworth, Delegate from
the United States).
96. Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 281, 312
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This solution, however, has been criticized as reintroducing
through interpretation an approach that was suggested by
Western nations and rejected at the diplomatic conference. 97
The concern is that through this approach "[other countries
would then be inclined to interpret into the Convention their
own rejected proposals."98 Further analysis reveals that such
criticism is invalid. The issue is not whose law or view prevails
ultimately, but rather which interpretation promotes interna-
tional trade by bringing uniformity and certainty to the legal
rules. The express purpose for the delegates at the Convention
was not to debate who had the better law, but rather how best to
accommodate national and international interests, without un-
dermining domestic sovereignty and legal order. In the process,
many nations made "sacrifices" so that a workable solution could
be found.9 9 If an interpretation promises to bring certainty to
international trade, such interpretation should be encouraged
and followed, even if such interpretation was not adopted at the
Convention. This approach is not only appropriate but particu-
larly essential in the case of CISG, where there is no editorial
body to amend the Convention periodically to discard principles
that no longer serve the goals of the Convention. Thus, it is en-
tirely inappropriate to look only to national laws to determine
the applicable interest rate.
It has been argued that the sole purpose of requiring inter-
est payments is to prevent the debtor from taking advantage of
the funds withheld. 100 The Convention addresses the issue of
unjust enrichment separately under Article 84. Article 84(1) re-
quires the seller to pay interest when the seller has to refund
(1994) (quoting PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (INTER-
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT) 1994),
art.7.4.10 cmt.). The comment to Article 7.4.10 of the UNIDROIT Principles
supports the general principle of full compensation and interest payment mea-
sured to fulfill the objective of that general principle. Id.
97. Ferrari, supra note 85, at 478 n.64.
98. Id. (quoting FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SALE OF GOODS: CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 313 (1992)).
99. For example, the United States sacrificed the principle of the statute of
frauds (U.C.C. § 2-201) by ratifying the Convention without a statute of frauds.
See CISG, supra note 1, art. 11. Similarly, the Islamic nations that prohibit
charging any interest seem to have yielded to the Convention by agreeing to be
bound by Article 78 that expressly awards interest payment. See id. art 78.
100. Case 5 U 261/90 (Fr. v. F.R.G.), Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main,
(June 13, 1991), RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr (RIW) 591 (1991),
available in UNILEX, supra note 3, translated in 14 J.L. &. COM. 229 (1995).
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the purchase price or any down payment. 10 1 An analysis of the
the interplay between the general principle of preventing unjust
enrichment and the earlier-stated general principle of full com-
pensation suggests that the principle of preventing unjust en-
richment has a limited role in the Convention. For example,
imagine two scenarios. In both cases the interest rates at buyer's
place and seller's place are ten percent and five percent, respec-
tively. In the first scenario, the buyer breaches and does not
pay. What should the seller get by way of interest rate? Should
he be compensated for his actual loss, which is five percent at his
place of business, in which case he is fully compensated, or
should he get buyer's unjust enrichment of ten percent rate. If
he gets the ten percent rate, the buyer's unjust enrichment is
taken away, but the seller is certainly being overcompensated
and arguably is being unjustly enriched.
In the second scenario, the seller defaults and does not re-
turn the price or down payment. If the aim is to prevent unjust
enrichment, seller needs to pay only five percent interest (which
is the prevailing rate at seller's place of business). If the objec-
tive is full compensation of the aggrieved party, the seller needs
to pay a ten percent interest rate, which works out to be a type
of penalty to the seller. However, there is no unjust enrichment
to the buyer. Thus, in one case full compensation of the ag-
grieved party (seller) may lead to unjust enrichment of the
breaching party (buyer) with no penalty to either party. In an-
other case, it may lead to a penalty to the breaching party
(seller, by not refunding the buyer's money) and no unjust en-
richment to either party.
To continue the analysis, assume the converse position that
preventing unjust enrichment, rather than full compensation, is
the goal to be pursued. Assume the same two scenarios as to
interest rates that are described above. When the seller
breaches and withholds the buyer's payment, the seller is re-
quired to pay five percent interest, but the buyer is not fully
compensated. Because the seller's payment is limited to his ac-
tual unjust enrichment, there is no penalty to the seller. More
interestingly however, when the buyer breaches, preventing un-
101. "If the seller is bound to refund the price, he must also pay interest on
it, from the date on which the price was paid." CISG, supra note 1, art. 84(1).
Article 84(1)'s insistence that the interest payment should be made from the
date on which the price was paid, rather than from the time of notice to the
seller or some other later time, clearly shows that the seller should not be un-
justly enriched. While Article 84(1) focuses on the seller, Article 84(2) focuses
on the disgorgement of the buyer's unjust enrichment. Id. art. 84(2).
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just enrichment requires that the buyer pay a ten percent inter-
est rate. While there is no penalty to the buyer, this leads to a
curious result of conferring unjust enrichment on the seller be-
cause he is compensated at a ten percent interest rate while his
loss is only at five percent. Thus the goal of preventing unjust
enrichment eliminates the penalty to the breaching party, but
leaves the aggrieved party either under- or overcompensated.
A judge faced with these two scenarios is in a difficult posi-
tion. Accordingly, further analysis of the underlying general
principles should be undertaken. The broader and primary goal
of the Convention is to compensate the aggrieved party fully.
Once this goal is accomplished, if there is still unjust enrich-
ment on the part of the breacher, such unjust enrichment should
be disgorged depending on the facts. Assume that the seller
withheld the refund money to the buyer due to some circum-
stances beyond his control (but not a force majeure situation), as
in the case of a governmental exchange control. In contrast, if
the seller was simply "riding" the high interest rate in his coun-
try, the seller stands to gain even if he fully compensates the
buyer at the lower interest rate in buyer's country. By applying
the broader general principle of good faith and reasonable be-
havior, the seller in the second instance should be made to dis-
gorge all the interest gain because, even though such behavior
may be economically efficient to both parties, the seller may not
be acting in good faith. This analysis not only satisfies the oper-
ative general principles of full compensation and unjust enrich-
ment, but also promotes good faith and reasonable behavior
between the parties in international trade, thereby fulfilling the
mandates of Article 7. Thus, the formulation based on the
breaching party's gain by withholding payment should be re-
jected. Consequently, the prevailing interest rate in the breach-
ing party's country should be irrelevant. Similarly, the interest
rate of a third country where the payment was supposed to have
taken place should also be irrelevant, unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that such interest rate somehow would have been
material to him.10 2
A review of the recent international case law indicates that
many tribunals have missed the mark and have contributed to
inconsistent results. A German tribunal rejected outright the
approach based on general principles and argued that even
102. In other words, the plaintiff may demonstrate that it was his business
practice to deposit the funds he receives from sale in a country with a higher
interest rate, whichever country that might happen to be.
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when CISG was still only in the preparatory stages the dele-
gates could not agree on a uniform solution. -03 Some courts dis-
play the intent to follow Article 7 but do not pay sufficient
attention to the general principles. They simply state that the
Convention has no general principles that are applicable to the
interest rate problem. 10 4 By following domestic law, the interest
rates being paid lacked uniformity. For example, in Delchi Car-
rier S.pA. v. Rotorex Corp,'05 the United States district court
stated that because Article 78 of CISG does not specify the inter-
est rate, the rate should be fixed in its "discretion" and granted
the rate of the United States Treasury Bill. One court deter-
mined that the interest rate is the average bank lending rate at
the creditor's place of business.' 0 6 Another variation was that
the rate awarded was an international trade rate known as LI-
BOR (London International Bank Offered Rate) that is com-
monly used with Eurodollars, the currency in which payment
was to be made. 10 7 While this approach may have the virtue of
creating uniformity in its application, it may fail to fulfill the
Convention's general principle of full compensation.' 08
These cases also illustrate another issue in interest rate cal-
culations, namely, the role of a statutory rate and the burden of
proof. Because the payment of interest is stated as a positive
obligation on the part of the debtor, it may be a fair presumption
that the creditor is owed at least the statutory interest rate or
103. Case 41 0 111/95 (Italy v. F.R.G.) Landgericht Aachen (July 20, 1995)
(abstract) (unpublished), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
The Court rejected the opinion according to which the interest rate, in
order to achieve a uniform international regulation, shall be deter-
mined in accordance with the general principles on which CISG is
based: as a matter of fact even when CISG was still only in the prepar-
atory stage it had not been possible to reach a uniform solution to this
problem.
Id.
104. Courts often remark that "the general principles do not settle the mat-
ter." E.g., Arbitral Award 7565 (Neth. v. U.S.), ICC Ct. Arb. (1994), 6 ICC CT.
ARB. BULL. 64, available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
105. Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., No. 88-CV-1078, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12820, at *16 (N.D.N.Y Sept. 7, 1994) (mem. and order).
106. Case 41 0 198/89, (Italy v. F.R.G.) Landgericht Aachen (Apr. 3, 1990)
RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr (RIW) 491 (1990), available in
UNILEX, supra note 3.
107. Arbitral Award 6653, supra note 68.
108. It should be remembered, however, that had the currency of payment
not been Eurodollars, this approach might not be desirable. Such an approach
of tying the interest rate to an international index may be inapplicable to the
plaintiffs actual loss. This solution was rejected by the delegates. HONNOLD,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 759 (remarks of Mr. Dabin, Belgium).
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the commercial lending rate, whichever is lower. If the creditor
incurred higher costs, he has the burden of proving the actual
loss. When a contract between a German seller and an Egyptian
buyer was avoided, the seller was required to return the buyer's
money.109 Private international law rules led to the application
of German law and the interest rate awarded was the German
statutory rate of four percent. 110 The plaintiff, however, asked
for 13%, even though the facts were unclear whether thirteen
percent was the prevailing rate in Egypt, statutory or otherwise,
or whether the rate reflected the buyer's otherwise provable
loss."' 1 Assuming that the Egyptian creditor could not meet his
burden of proving his actual losses, the court's denial of the thir-
teen percent rate is correct. But even in that case, granting the
German statutory rate is incorrect because it does not focus on
the creditor's loss.
In case there is no actual loss, the creditor could still prove
his future probable losses by showing his habitual investment
practices. A German court ordered the seller to pay a thirteen
percent interest rate when the statutory rate was only five per-
cent, because the statutory rate did not reflect the rate that a
business would get on its loans. 112 Even awarding actual loss,
if it is higher than what the plaintiff could have received under
its regular course of business, it is subject to the plaintiffs duty
under Article 77 to mitigate.11 3 This sensible approach was re-
flected in the opinion when the court denied the plaintiffs claim
for sixteeen and a half percent interest rate, which was higher
than he should have paid.114 In another case the court awarded
twelve percent interest when the statutory rate was five per-
109. Case 20 U 76/94 (Egypt v. F.R.G.) Oberlandsgericht Celle, (May 24,
1995) (abstract) (unpublished), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
110. Id.
111. "Der Kinger hat beantragt, die Beklagte zu verurteilen, an ihn 70.000
DM nebst 13% Zinsen seit dem 13.02. 1993 zu zahlen." Id. (textual meaning as
translated by the author).
112. Case 5 0 543/88 (Italy v. F.R.G.), Landgericht Hamburg (Sept. 26,
1990), reprinted in PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALES PRIVAT- UND VERFAHREN-
SRECHTS (IPRax) 400 (1991), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
113. The Convention states:
A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as
are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss
of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures,
the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the
amount by which the loss should have been mitigated.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 77.
114. Case 2 C 600/94 (Italy v. F.R.G.), Amtsgericht Wangen (Mar. 8, 1995)
(abstract) (unpublished), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
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cent.115 These rules, while supported by the general principles
of full compensation and fair dealing, also represent a fair allo-
cation of the burden of proof and a fair distribution of risk for
the debtor for his delay in payment. In addition, these rules
take into account the realities of the market place.
Many courts seem to have determined the interest rates by
simply following domestic rules, or in some cases, without indi-
cating any clear rationale. For example, a German court of ap-
peal in Munich awarded the statutory interest rate of Sweden
(the creditor's place of business), which was higher than the dis-
count rate of the Swedish Central Bank.11 6 Similarly, a Swiss
court awarded a Swiss buyer the Italian statutory interest rate
when the buyer avoided the contract for the Italian seller's fail-
ure to perform. 117 The court should have focused on the buyer's
loss, which was in Switzerland, and ordered payment of interest
at the Swiss rate. The facts did not indicate that the seller was
acting in bad faith, thus requiring disgorgement of the higher
interest he earned in Italy. 118
In yet another case, an arbitrator granted an interest rate
based on the currency in which the contract price was to be
paid. 119 The Italian seller demanded the high inflationary Ital-
ian rate of interest when the contract price was to be paid in
German marks. The arbitrator denied the demand, stating that
when the contract price is to be paid in strong currency, it would
be "illogical" to base the interest rate according to the seller's
place of business which has a high interest rate. 120 This is a
sensible decision. The seller was expecting payment in German
115. Arbitral Award 7197 (Aus. v. BuIg.), ICC Ct. Arb. (1993), reprinted in J.
DU Daorr INT'L, 1028-37 (1993), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
116. Case 7 U 4419/93 (Swed. v. F.R.G.), Oberlandesgericht Miinchen (Mar.
2, 1994), reprinted in RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN W1RTSCHAFr (RIW) 595-97
(1994), available in UNILEX, supra note 3. The dispute was between a Swed-
ish seller and a German buyer for the sale of coal. As discussed supra, the deter-
mination of interest rate as per the seller's "loss" in Sweden is appropriate. But
the award of the statutory rate, which is higher than the bank discount rate, is
questionable. It is simply not reasonable for the seller to have borrowed at the
higher statutory rate when the bank offers a lower rate. In this case, the award-
ing of higher interest rate shows a failure on the court's part to recognize the
general principle of the Convention and has violated the Article 7 mandates of
good faith in interpretation. Id.
117. Case 77/89, Foliopack AG v. Daniplast S.P.A., Pretura di Parma-
Fidenza (Nov. 24, 1989) (unpublished), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
118. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text (discussing payment of
interest as a means of preventing unjust enrichment).
119. Arbitral Award 7585 (Italy v. Fin.), ICC Ct. Arb. (1992), 6 ICC INT'L CT.
ArB. BULL. 60 (Nov. 1995), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
120. Id.
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marks and, absent evidence to show that he would have con-
verted the payment into Italian lira immediately upon receipt
(in which case he would have lost the high interest rate but
would have also suffered high inflation), it would have been sim-
ply unfair to pay at the Italian rate.
While many courts have misunderstood or have misapplied
the Article 7 mandates, a few courts have recognized the general
principle of full compensation and applied it properly. 121 In Ar-
bitral Award SCH-4318, the arbitrator stated that merchants
resort to bank credit when payment from the other party is
delayed. Thus the party (the buyer in this case) should be com-
pensated for the interest rate in his place of business with re-
spect to the currency of payment, which was agreed upon as U.S.
dollars. The arbitrator also noted that the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples of International Commercial Contracts suggest the same so-
lution. 122 This reasoning was also followed in another arbitral
award from Austria. 123
Disagreement also exists as to whether interest payments
are mandatory, even in force majeure situations. It has been
suggested that because interest payment is a general obligation,
if the seller is able to claim payment after the force majeure situ-
ation has been overcome (as in the case of a temporary ban in
the buyer's country on payment in foreign currency), he can
claim interest on it.124 The counter-argument is that because
interest is part of damages, the payment of interest should be
exempted in force majeure situations. 125 Because the Conven-
tion makes the payment of interest a separate obligation, the
argument based on the premise that interest is part of damages
should be rejected. On the other hand, because interest payment
is a general obligation, the argument that interest can be
claimed even under force majeure situations should also be re-
121. See generally Arbitral Award SCH-4318 (F.R.G. v Aus.), Internation-
ales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft, Wien
(June 15, 1994), reprinted in RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT (RIW)
591-92 (1994), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
122. Id.
123. Arbitral Award SCH-4366 (Aus. v. F.R.G.), Internationales Schiedsger-
icht der Bundeskammer der Gewerblichen Wirtschafl, Wien (June 15, 1994),
reprinted in REC-T DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT (RIW) 590-91 (1994),
available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
124. Ferrari, supra note 85, at 475 n.46 (quoting Barry Nicholas, Article 78:
Interest, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw: THE 1980 VIENNA
SALES CONVENTION 568, 571 (C.M. Bianca & Michael J. Bonell eds., 1987)).
125. Id. (citing F.J.A. VAN DER VELDEN, HET WEENSE KoOPVEDRAG 1980 EN
zIJu RECHTSMIDDELEN 405 (1988)).
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jected. This argument misinterprets the relationship between
Articles 78 and 79. Article 79(1) exempts a party from any of his
obligations, including the obligation under Article 78, in cases of
force majeure. Thus, after the temporary ban ends, the buyer is
only liable to pay interest from the date the ban ends, i.e., from
the date the obligation to pay resumes.
Another argument is that Article 78 is not enforceable if any
clause containing interest payments is invalid under domestic
law. 126 This argument is not convincing because it does not rec-
ognize the special status of the text of the Convention. The lan-
guage of the Convention reflects the binding compromise the
national delegates made on behalf of those nations that have
ratified the Convention. Thus, if an issue is specifically ad-
dressed by the text of the Convention, it overrules domestic
law. 127 The issue of interest payment was specifically addressed,
debated, and resolved in the Convention. The text of the Con-
vention stands for the proposition that the domestic law is over-
ruled on that issue, unless the objecting nation made a
reservation to derogate from the Convention. Therefore, it be-
comes unnecessary to consult domestic law on the validity of the
issue. In the same vein, it is incorrect for an American party to
argue that an oral contract is not valid if the goods exceed $500
in value, as provided by the UCC. When the United States rati-
fied the Convention, it agreed to subordinate its domestic law to
the Convention on that provision. Thus, arguments based on
the validity exception of Article 4(a) misunderstand the provi-
sion, nullify the express provisions of the Convention, and apply
domestic law inappropriately. 128
B. Pomrw OF ACCRUAL
Another issue that is producing divergent results in the
courts is the time from which to award interest. The general
principle of full compensation requires that the plaintiff be paid
interest from the date that payment should have been made.
Many courts seem to have followed this approach. 129 However,
126. Id. at 478 n.63.
127. It is recognized, however, that the Convention has provided, at least in
case of Article 28 on specific performance, that it is only available if the domes-
tic law provides the remedy.
128. See infra notes 179-202 and accompanying text (discussing validity
issues).
129. See the following cases for the rule that interest accrues from the date
payment was due. Available in UNILEX, supra note 3 (translations are by the
author):
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by ignoring the general principle and relying instead on domes-
tic law, some tribunals produce variations on the time for ac-
crual. When a buyer sued for a refund of the purchase price, one
court held that the interest should accrue from the date of avoid-
ance of the contract, not from the date the buyer paid the
purchase price to the seller. 130 In another case the court mea-
sured the interest rate from the date of giving notice to the de-
fendant of a possible claim. 131 Yet another court ruled that
interest should be awarded from the time when the aggrieved
seller would "normally have resold" the goods after the buyer's
breach.' 3 2 Still another variation was that interest should ac-
crue from a date that is determined by "a usage widely known
Case 3 C 75/94 (Italy v. F.R.G.), Amtsgericht Nordhorn (June 14, 1994) (un-
published) ("Der Zinsanspruch ist gem&iB Artikel 78 CISG gerechtfertigt. Nach
dieser Vorschrift sind Zinsen ab Ff.lligkeit zu zahlen." (interest is due from the
date of failure to pay)); Case 156 (Fr. v. Spain), Cour d'Appel de Grenoble
Chambre Commerciale (Mar. 29, 1995) (unpublished) ("[T]he duty to pay inter-
est for the delay in payment is not conditional on a formal request by the
seller."). Compare Arbitral Award 7331/1994, supra note 12 (such notice being
a prerequisite to claim interest from the date of notice). Case 920159 (Italy v.
Neth.), Gruppo IMAR S.p.A. v. Protech Horst, Arrondissementsrechtsbank
Roemond, (May 6, 1993) (abstract) (unpublished) (interest accrues from the
date when payment was due); Arbitral Award 6653, supra note 68 ("In accord-
ance with Arts. 78 and 84 CISG the buyer was awarded interest on the price to
be refunded, accruing from the date of payment"); Case 1 C 216/92 (Italy v.
F.R.G.), Amtsgericht Zweibriicken (Oct. 14, 1992) (unpublished) (no formal no-
tice required for the interest to accrue); Case 15/91 (Fr. v. Switz.), Pretura di
Locarno-Campagna (Dec. 16, 1991), published in Revue suisse de droit interna-
tional et de droit europ, en (RSDIE) 663 (1993) (no formal notice required for
accrual of interest from the date payment due); Case 20 U 76/94, supra note 109
("Der Zinsanspruch des KlIgers ergibt sich aus Art. 84 Abs. 1 CISG, wonach der
Verkdufer, wenn er den Kaufpreis zuruckzuzahlen hat, auflerdem von Tag der
Zahlung an auf den Betrag Zinzen zablen mul.l" (The interest is due from the
date of payment)).
130. Case 77/89, supra note 117.
131. See Arbitral Award 7331, supra note 12. If no notice is given, then the
accrual point is from the time of arbitration. "It is also generally acknowledged
that interest does not begin to accrue until proper notice of the claim has been
given." Id.
132. Arbitral Award 7565, supra note 104. "Interest shall be computed from
January 1, 1992, on the assumption that the cargo would normally have been
resold to Claimant's customers by the end of December 1991." Id. The Claim-
ant asked for the accrual date starting August 14, 1991, presumably the date
the buyer defaulted. Id. This is a poor application of Article 7, which mandates
uniformity in interpretation. How could one know when the cargo "would nor-
mally have been resold" in international trade? Why is it necessary to resort to
such an empirical rule when the general principles of the Convention clearly
establish that the seller be fully compensated for all losses and it is the practi-
cal experience of any business person that she would incur interest payments
for money she had to borrow from the date of borrowing?
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and regularly observed in international trade."133 The abstract
did not define usage, and did not specify what time frame was
used in that particular case. By referring to international trade
usage, the court seemingly pointed to a general principle of the
Convention, rather than to a domestic law.'34
The method discussed thus far for measuring the time for
accrual of interest assumes that the seller has made a con-
forming delivery. If there is no conforming delivery, obviously
the seller cannot be entitled to accrual of interest from the date
of delivery. This fairness was recognized when one court
awarded interest from the date the seller cured the defects in
the goods. 135 This is an appropriate decision because it properly
balanced the principle of fairness to the seller against the princi-
ple of fairness to the buyer.
C. THE CURRENCY FOR PAYMENT
The Convention is silent on the currency in which the price
is to be paid. This problem does not usually arise, because if the
price is agreed upon by the parties, they will have negotiated the
price with reference to a certain currency. The problem does
arise, however, when the price term is left open and the court
fills the gap using Article 55. The delegates at the Diplomatic
Conference deliberated on the issue of currency and voted
against a proposal to fix a specific currency for payment. 136 The
general rule based on trade usage seems to be that the currency
133. Case 7 (Arg. v. U.S.), Elastar Sacifia v. Bettcher Industries Inc.,
Jugzado Nacional de Primera Instancia en lo Comercial (May 20, 1991) (ab-
stract) (unpublished) (citing CISG, art. 9(2)), available in UNILEX, supra note
3.
134. Id. However, the court did indeed resort to a domestic law without
searching for any general principles when it stated that Ohio law should be
used as per the Argentinian rules of private international law. Id.
135. Case RG 93/4879, Marques Roque Joachim v. La Sarl Holding Manin
Riviere, Cour d'Appel de Grenoble Chambre Commerciale (Apr. 26, 1995) (un-
published), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
136. The proposal was introduced by the Spanish delegation and provided
that the seller could require the buyer to pay the price in the buyer's currency,
even if the buyer's domestic exchange controls prevented him from paying in
another currency. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 583.
"The problems connected with the currency of payment were related to those
concerning the validity of the contract, which, under article 4(a) of the draft
Convention, were excluded from its sphere of application." Id. at 584 (Remarks
of Mr. Krispis, Greece).
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will be that of the place of payment (the seller's place of busi-
ness, under Article 57(1)(a)). 137
If the seller's place of business changes (either because the
seller moved or because he assigned the contract to another from
a different country) and the currency of the seller's new place is
a hard currency, should the buyer pay in that hard currency?
The answer should be no, because a change of seller's place of
business is not a risk that the buyer contemplated (unless there
was an agreement to the contrary) upon entering the contract.
In fact, the Convention explicitly states that a rise in costs asso-
ciated with the seller's change of place of business should not be
borne by the buyer. 138 This result also flows from recognition of
the general principle that the distribution of risk is fixed "at the
conclusion of the contract."139
D. PLACE OF PAYMENT
The Convention provides that the buyer is required to pay
at the seller's place of business unless a specific place of pay-
ment is agreed upon.140 If payment is due against handing over
the goods or the documents, the payment is due at the place
where such handing over takes place. 14' If the buyer defaults,
the discussion above on fixing of interest rate142 indicates that
the seller can sue for interest at the rate prevailing in the
seller's place of business. But if the place of exchange is a third
country and the buyer defaults, to what interest rate should the
seller be entitled?
An Austrian seller and a Croatian buyer agreed that the
payment was to be made against handing over the goods in
Prague, in the Czech Republic,' 43 and no choice of law was
137. Case 2 U 7418/92 (Italy v. F.R.G.), Kammergericht Berlin (Jan. 24,
1994) RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr (RIW) 683 (1994), available in
UNILEX, supra note 3; see also Case 2 U 1230/91 (Fr. v. F.R.G.), Ober-
landesgericht Koblenz, (Sept. 17, 1993) RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WmT-
scHArr (RIW) 934-38 (1993), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
138. "The seller must bear any increase in the expenses incidental to pay-
ment which is caused by a change in his place of business subsequent to the
conclusion of the contract." CISG, supra note 1, art. 57(2).
139. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the general prin-
ciple of the Convention that the distribution of risk should be determined at the
conclusion of the contract).
140. CISG, supra note 1, art. 57(1)(a).
141. Id. art. 57(1)(b).
142. See supra notes 85-128 and accompanying text (discussing interest
rates).
143. Case 7153 (Aus. v. Yugo.), ICC Ct. Arb. (1992), translated by Vivian
Curran, 14 J.L. & COM. 217 (1995).
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agreed upon in the contract. When the buyer failed to pay, the
seller sued for the price and the interest payment at the rate
prevailing in Prague, because interest rates were higher in
Prague than in Austria. The court ruled that, under the rules of
private international law, Prague was the place of performance
and thus its interest rate controlled.
Under the general principle of full compensation, the seller
should have been awarded the credit costs suffered as a result of
the buyer's default. The seller's costs in the usual case are the
costs in the seller's own country, unless the seller typically bor-
rows money in Prague for business needs or deposits money in
Prague to earn interest. Thus, unless the seller could have
demonstrated that the interest rate in Prague was material to
its business, the Prague interest rate should not have been al-
lowed. If the payment were to be made in Czech currency, the
interest rate arguably should be tied to that currency.144 The
facts were not clear as to currency in this case.145
Applying the Czech interest rate was also incorrect because,
by expressly providing in Article 57(1)(b) for choosing a third
country as the place of performance, the Convention requires
that it be the controlling law. When the parties chose Prague as
the place of performance, it was not derogating from the Con-
vention under Article 6, but following the Convention. Neither
Czech law nor the law of the parties should control, but rather
the Convention should control. Under the general principles of
the Convention, the seller's full compensation should have been
the guiding principle. Thus, unless the seller could demonstrate
that the Czech interest rate would have been applicable to its
business, the seller should not have been allowed to claim that
rate.
III. THE ROLE AND NATURE OF "GOOD FAITH"
A. "GOOD FAITH" AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE
The Convention states that in its interpretation, "regard is
to be had to... the need to promote uniformity in its application
and the observance of good faith in international trade."146 The
drafting history of the Convention reveals that the delegates
144. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (discussing interest
rates).
145. Even if the interest rate is tied to a particular currency, the interest
rate still would be not be the rate in Prague, because the interest rate should be
based on the currency in the seller's place of business.
146. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
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were divided on the role of good faith in the Convention. 147 Be-
yond concerns about what "good faith" is, the exact role of good
faith in the Convention is unclear. A plain reading of Article
7(1) suggests that in interpreting the Convention, "regard is to
be had to . . . the observance of good faith in international
trade."148 This reading requires the judge to look for good faith
behavior and interpret the Convention so that the party who has
deviated from good faith behavior should not be looked upon fa-
vorably. Another reading is that in interpreting the Convention,
"regard is to be had ... to the need to promote ... the observance
of good faith in international trade."149 Under this reading, the
judge should interpret the Convention with an emphasis on pro-
moting good faith in international trade, so that the holding will
not necessarily be limited to the instant facts of the case.
The distinction between the two readings may be largely ac-
ademic because, under either reading, the essential focus is on
the behavior of the parties. The legislative history, however,
shows that many delegates objected to the imposition of "good
faith" as a general obligation on the parties in the performance
of the contract along the lines of Uniform Commercial Code §1-
203.150 Many authorities agree that "the Convention rejects
good faith as a general requirement and uses good faith solely as
a principle for interpreting the provisions of the Convention."151
The legislative history suggests that the "good faith" require-
ment should apply only in interpretation of the Convention: the
147. Some delegates objected to the inclusion of good faith because it simply
represented a moral exhortation which should not be elevated to the status of a
legal obligation without explicit details on how to apply the principle in a given
situation. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 3, at 369. Another ob-
jection was that it was unnecessary to include the provision in the Convention
because the principle of good faith was implicit in all national laws. Id. In
addition, delegates objected that the Convention does not specify the sanctions
for failing to comply with the good faith principle and that in imposing any
sanctions the domestic law will be used with the resulting inconsistency. Id.
In support of having the good faith provision in the Convention, it was
argued that there is little harm in having such a provision because the principle
is "universally recognized." Id. The consequences of violation need not be
spelled out in the Convention, but rather can be developed in a flexible manner
on a case by case basis. Id.
148. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. See generally HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 3, § 95; Peter Win-
ship, Commentary on Professor Kastely's Rhetorical Analysis, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 623, 630-33 (1988).
151. Professor Honnold at one point states that the "good faith" provision of
Article 7(1) bears only on the interpretation of provisions of the Convention.
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAw, supra note 3, § 65 n.4.
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obligation of "good faith" is directed primarily to the judges who
ultimately pass on the Convention, and not to the parties.
On the other hand, a general-principles analysis of the vari-
ous provisions of the Convention makes it clear that "good faith"
is so pervasive a concept that it must be a general principle of
the Convention. Many provisions of the Convention represent
"good faith" through its variants, such as "reasonableness" or
"fair dealing."15 2 In reality, it has been acknowledged that
"[tihe principle of good faith is, however, broader than these ex-
amples and applies to all aspects of the interpretation and appli-
cation of the provisions of this Convention." 153 The drafters of
the Convention seem to have achieved indirectly the objective of
imposing "good faith" on the conduct of the parties by purporting
to require "good faith" in interpretation only. Even though the
drafting history impressively supports Professor Winship's ar-
gument to the contrary, the pervasive presence of good faith as
an obligation on the parties dictates that such an obligation in-
deed must exist. If good faith in international trade were to be
promoted by a liberal application of the provisions of the Con-
vention, how else can a judge promote "good faith" in trade other
than by requiring the parties to behave in good faith? Stated
differently, good faith cannot exist in a vacuum and does not re-
main in practice as a rule unless the actors are required to par-
ticipate.' 54 Thus, it seems that "good faith" performs dual roles
in the Convention: one directed to the parties and the other di-
rected to the judiciary. The former role arises from the textual
provision and the general principles of the Convention, and the
latter role comes from the legislative history of the Convention.
152. The following list of provisions referring to reasonableness has been
adapted from Professor Honnold's work and is further expanded. See generally
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAw, supra note 3, arts. 16 (b) (reasonable reliance); 18(2),
33(c), 39(1), 43(1), 46(2), 46(3), 47(1), 48(2), 49(2), 63(1), 64(2)(b), 65(1), 65(2),
73(2), 75, 79(4), (reasonable time); 34, 37, 86(2) (unreasonable inconvenience or
expense); 88(1) (unreasonable delay); 76(2) (reasonable substitute); 75 ( reason-
able manner); 79(1) (reasonable expectations); 85 (reasonable steps); 88(2) (rea-
sonable measures to sell); 72 (reasonable time for notice); 35(2)(b)
(unreasonable reliance); 38(3) (reasonable opportunity for examination); 88(2)
(unreasonable expense); 8(2), 25 (reasonable person); 48(1) (unreasonable delay,
inconvenience or expense); 44 (reasonable excuse); 72(2), 88(1) (reasonable no-
tice); 77, 86(1) (reasonable steps in the circumstances); 85, 86(1), 87, 88(2), 88(3)
(reasonable expenses).
153. HONNOLD, DocuMENTARY HisTORY, supra note 3, at 408.
154. Winship, supra note 150, at 630-33. Professor Winship later seemed to
agree in reconciliation that the "question of how 'good faith' relates to the Con-
vention is more complex than [he] originally suggested." Id. at 633.
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"Good faith" in international case law seems to be an issue
that is discussed infrequently. One court, however, expressly
recognized the nature and the attending disagreement among
the authorities on the role of good faith in the Convention.' 55
The court held that despite the disagreement, the principle of
estoppel or the prohibition of venire contra factum proprium,
.represents a special application of the general principle of good
faith and without doubt is seen as one of the general principles
on which the Convention is based.' 56 The role of good faith in
international trade is evolving and moving towards an interna-
tional concept.' 5 7
B. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The subject of liquidated damages is not explicitly covered
in the Convention, 158 although there was considerable support
for the idea that the Uniform Law should regulate liquidated
damages clauses.159 The Committee felt that such regulation is
particularly desirable because the rules on liquidated damages
vary widely, and it would be a practical contribution to interna-
tional trade to bring uniformity in their application. 160 The
Committee again could not agree on proper language that would
avoid the technical problems associated with the proposed
155. See Arbitral Award SCH-4318, supra note 121. An Austrian seller and
a German buyer contracted for the purchase of rolled metal sheets. The materi-
als, upon delivery, were sold to merchants down the chain of trade. The ulti-
mate buyer refused to pay by alleging defects in quality. The Austrian seller
refused to pay damages claiming that the notice was not timely. The court
ruled that the Austrian seller was prevented from raising the defense of un-
timely notice because the seller, through its conduct, led the buyer to believe
that the seller would not raise that defense. The court found that the seller
continued to ask the buyer for information on the status of the complaints and
pursued negotiations seemingly to reach a settlement agreement. The court
cited to some scholarly commentary and argued that the seller was estopped
from denying such conduct which induced reliance in the buyer. Id.
156. Id.
157. "The kind of reasonableness [being discussed] seems to... have much
in common with the notions of good faith which are regarded in many of the
civil law systems of Europe and in all States in the United States as necessarily
implied in many kinds of contract." Renard Constructions (ME) PTY LTD v.
Minister for Public Works (Mar. 12, 1992), reprinted in 26 NEW S. WALES L.
REP. 234 (1992), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
158. A provision on liquidated damages was considered at the 1977 UNCI-
TEAL review of the Working Group "Sales" draft. HONNOLD, DOcUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 3, at 354.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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draft. 161 As a result, the basic principle underlying the liqui-
dated damages provision was not rejected in the Convention.
Accordingly, a liquidated damages clause agreed upon by the
parties should be given full effect under the Article 6 principle of
contractual freedom to derogate from the Convention.
At least two courts misunderstood the provision and misin-
terpreted it, casting doubt not only on the future of liquidated
damages clauses under the Convention, but also on the court's
ability and willingness to comply with the Article 7 mandates of
international interpretation of the Convention. When an Aus-
trian seller and a Bulgarian buyer entered into a contract for the
sale of goods, they specifically agreed to limit their damages to a
certain percentage of the contract price, regardless of who failed
to perform. 162 After noting that the CISG did not expressly ad-
dress liquidated damages, an arbitration court applied Austrian
domestic law to determine if the liquidation clause was valid. 163
The court held that the seller should recover all damages suf-
fered, in spite of the specific agreement to limit the damages by
a penalty clause. The parties seemed to have been commercially
sophisticated and their agreement should have been
respected.'6 4 The court ignored the Article 6 provision that the
parties may derogate from or vary the effect of any of the provi-
sions of the Convention. There was no inquiry needed to deter-
mine the validity of the liquidated damages clause.' 65 The only
inquiry should have been whether the parties were behaving in
161. The Committee decided to postpone dealing with the issue because of
limited time and because the scope of liquidated damages could be greater than
the Convention itself. Id. The Committee decided that it might be appropriate
to cover the issue under another instrument. Id.
162. Arbitral Award 7197, supra note 115. The contract between an Aus-
trian seller and a Bulgarian buyer had a "penalty clause" for a certain percent-
age of the price in case of non-performance by either party. Id. Even though
the court did not label the clause as a liquidated damages clause, it probably
was a liquidated damages clause. Id. The facts indicated that the clause lim-
ited damages to either party to a certain percentage of the price in case of non-
performance by either party. Id.
163. The translated abstract as provided in UNILEX refers to the liquidated
damages as "penalty clause." Id. This nomenclature may confuse lawyers
trained in the United States, because "liquidated damages" are void as penalty.
See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718(1).
164. The issue of whether commercial sophistication should matter in inter-
national transactions has been addressed in literature, but is beyond the scope
of this article. See generally Kastely, supra note 15, at 607-20.
165. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text (discussing the validity
issue).
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good faith as provided under Article 7(1). Thus, this ruling
seems to be unwarranted.1 66
Should the result be different if the buyer agreed to pay a
"compensation fee" that amounts to thirty percent of the con-
tract price even in a force majeure situation?167 One arbitrator
held that even though there was a "construction difficulty" of the
term "compensation fee" and that the phrase is "not usual in
legal vocabulary," the wording of the clause was not "precise
enough" to be construed as a liquidation clause which would
foreclose any claim for other damages. 168 The arbitrator focused
on the condition that the buyer agreed to pay the "compensation
fee" even in the condition of force majeure situations and inter-
preted to mean that the fee was "money payable in consideration
of the termination of the contract independently of any damages
suffered by Seller."169 The seller was awarded storage costs
under Article 77 ("mitigation" costs), seller's costs in modifying
the equipment for a substitute buyer, the lost profit resulting
from the substitute sale (Article 74 damages), the "compensation
fee" of thirty percent of the contract price, and interest on all the
amounts due.' 70
Given the ambiguity of the provision, the arbitrator had to
choose between granting or denying the thirty percent "compen-
sation fee." Even though the Convention does not address the
"compensation fee" issue, the issue could have been analyzed
under the general principles of the Convention, namely, the
principles of freedom of contract, fair dealing and good faith ob-
servance, and full compensation.'17 The seller was fully compen-
sated with all the damages under Articles 74, 75, 77 and 78.
Even though the principle of contractual freedom requires that
the fee provision should be respected, it is nonetheless subject to
the principles of good faith and fair dealing. Both parties were
merchants and were presumably dealing at arm's length. But
166. This criticism is only valid if the facts as supplied in the UNILEX ab-
stract are complete and there were no other facts that altered the complexion of
the case or that the court looked at in making this determination.
167. Arbitral Award 7585, supra note 119.
168. Id.
169. Id. "The mere fact that the compensation fee has to be paid in such a
situation evidences that it has a nature different from damages in compensa-
tion of a loss." Id.
170. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (discussing the award of
interest rate in this case).
171. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing full compen-
sation); note 150 and accompanying text (discussing fair dealing); notes 55-56
and accompanying text (discussing freedom of contract).
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the seller's provision required that in case of seller's breach, the
buyer would get only his down payment back, with no inter-
est.' 7 2 The seller seemed to have made a substitute sale in a
short time but only for approximately fifty percent of the con-
tract price, which raises the question of whether the sale was
done "in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time"
under the Convention. 173 Moreover, the seller asked for the
higher interest rate of Italy, whereas the contract money was to
be paid in German marks. 174 These facts raise an issue of unfair
dealing.
This case would have been an ideal opportunity for the court
to interpret the contract and the Convention under the Article 7
mandate of promoting observance of good faith in international
trade. Most likely the seller drafted the contract, and the seller
should have borne the consequences of any resulting ambiguity.
The court should have ruled that, after the plaintiff is fully com-
pensated, claims for additional sums must meet the test of good
faith. Or conversely, it is reasonable to assume that a high
(thirty percent) "compensation fee" indicates the nature of the
risk the buyer assumed in case he defaulted and that was all the
seller is entitled to recover. 175 Thus the court's ruling casts
doubt on the ability of courts to interpret liquidated damages
clauses in a manner that promotes observance of good faith in
international trade. 176
When a contract has been validly avoided, both parties are
required to make restitution concurrently. 177 When the buyer
172. Article XX of the contract provided that "[ilf the agreement is termi-
nated by fault of the supplier before the goods have been delivered, the pur-
chaser will be returned any sum he has previously transferred to the supplier
as down payment, without interest." Arbitral Award 7585, supra note 119. The
parties deviated from the Convention's provision that requires that buyer
should get interest paid on his down payment upon refund.
173. CISG, supra note 1, art. 75.
174. See supra notes 119-20 (explaining that the arbitrator rejected this de-
mand and awarded the German interest rate, which was less than the high
inflationary rate of Italy).
175. It is doubtful whether the buyer would have wanted to assume the risk
of paying approximately 80% of the contract price (50% as the contract market
differential plus a 30% "compensation fee"), the interest payment, equipment
conversion costs incurred to facilitate the substitute sale, and storage costs and
then not get the machine.
176. There is no issue of fraud suggested here, but rather unequal bargain-
ing positions. It should be noted that Professor Honnold suggests that the
"good faith" provision of the Article 7(1) is not meant to provide a general rem-
edy for fraud, because the "good faith" provision only applies to the interpreta-
tion of the Convention. HONNOLD, UNIFoRm LAW, supra note 3, § 65 n.7.
177. CISG, supra note 1, art. 81(2).
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in another case placed the goods at the seller's disposal, the
seller failed to take delivery and refused to refund the price. 178
The court stated that this matter is not expressly covered by the
CISG and that Article 31, which deals with the delivery of the
goods by the seller, is not applicable by analogy. After stating
that it could find no applicable general principles of the Conven-
tion, the court applied domestic law. Instead, the court should
have imposed on the seller an obligation of good faith and an
obligation to mitigate his losses. The court should have stayed
within the Convention rather than referring to domestic law.
IV. THE VALIDITY ISSUE: HOW BIG IS
THE BLACK HOLE?
A. CONSTRUCTION DIFFIcuLTIEs
The Convention, in Article 4(a), states that it is not con-
cerned with the validity of the contract or of any of its provi-
sions. However, the Convention does not define the term
"validity." The "validity" exception has been described as "a po-
tential 'black hole' [that removes] the issues from the Conven-
tion's universe."179 It was recognized long ago that the term
"validity" has at least two connotations: the formation aspect re-
ferring to whether the contract has met all of the requirements
for formation and the enforcement aspects referring to such is-
sues as whether the contract has an illegal objective or was ac-
complished through fraud.'80 Unfortunately, the Convention
does not specify which of these two types of validity it addresses.
Many authorities conclude that the validity exception
should be construed as narrowly as possible "to allow the Con-
vention to have the 'widest possible application consistent with
178. Case 54 0 644194 (Switz. v. F.R.G.), Landgericht Landshut (Apr. 5,
1995) (unpublished), available in UNILEX, supra note 3. A Swiss buyer and a
German seller entered into a contract for the sale of sports clothing. Due to
defects in the clothing and the incorrect quantity of items delivered, the court
held that the buyer validly declared the contract avoided after giving proper
notice. Id.
179. Winship, supra note 150, at 636.
180. Professor Hartnell states that the question of validity giving rise to
these connotations in meaning "is not new, but has yet to be fully answered."
Helen E. Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 1,
19 (1993). The question has been posed by an Italian delegate elsewhere in
1964 as following: "[W]hat [is] the meaning of the expression le contrat n'estpas
valable. [Does] it mean: that the contract is not concluded; that the contract is
not valid; [or] that the contract is valid, but it is not enforceable?" Id. n.73
(alterations in original) (citation omitted).
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its aim as a unifier of legal rules governing the relationship be-
tween the parties to an international sale.'" 18' Professor Hon-
nold states that it is "the substance rather than the label or
characterization of the competing rule of domestic law that de-
termines whether it is displaced by the Convention."18 2 More-
over, it is critical to ask "whether the Convention addresses the
situation in question; if so, the Uniform international rules
should not be displaced merely because of the labels attached to
various doctrines of domestic law."18 3 This consideration is es-
pecially important because the "issues of validity are difficult
matters which the differing national traditions made difficult to
unify in the Uniform Law"' 8 4 and thus can produce divergent
results. It is possible to limit the meaning of the term "validity"
to a "common core of meaning" because "[m]ost (if not all) coun-
tries will not enforce agreements on the grounds of illegality, ca-
pacity, fraud, mistake and duress." 85 Because Article 4(a) is
part of the Convention and its interpretation is subject to Article
7 mandates of internationality, uniformity, and good faith, this
narrow interpretation is appropriate.
Additionally, Article 4(a) should be interpreted against the
backdrop of the general principle of parties' contractual freedom
as stated in Article 6. If the parties are allowed to derogate, and
if they do, should the subject matter of their derogation become
an issue of validity to be analyzed under domestic law? A nega-
tive answer is preferable because Article 6 is not meant to be
such an easy escape clause from the Convention. Both the legis-
lative history and the purpose behind Article 6 strongly support
this conclusion.' 8 6 Otherwise, the breaching party could argue,
181. Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
182. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 3, § 65.
183. Id. § 240.
184. Winship, supra note 150, at 636 (citation omitted).
185. "[Mlost commentators agree that [the common core of the term "valid-
ity"] includes issues regarding fraud (dol), duress, unconscionability, legal ca-
pacity of the parties to enter into a contract, and error." Alejandro M. Garro,
Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAw. 443, 464 (Summer 1989); see also
Winship, supra note 150, at 638.
186. Article 6 in its earlier drafts was amended to prevent an "implied exclu-
sion" of the Convention. The purpose was to discourage courts from excluding
the application of the Convention on "insufficient grounds." See HONNOLD, Doc-
UMENTARY HIsToRY, supra note 3, at 61, 407. Later, the Working Group sug-
gested that the Convention should not be displaced unless the parties specified
which law would be applicable. Id. at 277. Such exclusion requires an express
or implied agreement between the parties and cannot be imposed unilaterally
by one party. Id. at 302. The raison d'tre of the Convention is that it would
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when it is advantageous, that the Convention should not apply
each time there is a derogation under Article 6.
A case decided in Germany is illustrative. The parties
agreed to derogate from the Convention and provided that the
buyer could avoid the contract only following a notice demand to
the seller to comply with the contract and only after fifteen
working days from the date that the seller received the notice to
comply.1 8 7 The court chose to refer to domestic law because the
validity of the contract clause is beyond the scope of the CISG
according to Article 4(a). In its haste to refer to domestic law,
the court failed to analyze an applicable provision under the
Convention. This clause in the contract was not very different
from the explicit provisions and the general principles underly-
ing Article 47. Article 47(1) allows the buyer to fix an additional
period of time of reasonable length for the seller to perform.' 8 8
Article 47(2) prevents the buyer from resorting to any remedy
prematurely, i.e., before the expiration of the time fixed under
47(1).189 The inquiry should not have been whether such clause
was "valid," but rather whether the time fixed was a reasonable
time. Under the facts of the case, fifteen days appears to have
been reasonable.
By embarking on the validity inquiry, the court misunder-
stood the role of Article 4(a) and its interaction with Article 6, as
well as the general principle of good-faith communication be-
tween the parties. Article 4(a) probably is not meant to cover
this situation because there is nothing illegal or fraudulent in
agreeing to notification with a reasonable time of a party's in-
tention to avoid the contract. To the contrary, by expressly
agreeing in advance to notify, the parties demonstrated their in-
tentions to follow the Convention's general principles. The court
should have actively tried to resolve the issue of validity under
the general principles of the Convention. Only if an answer
apply automatically unless the parties expressly or impliedly derogated from it.
Id. at 322.
187. Case 3 C 75/94 (Italy v. F.R.G.), Amtsgericht Nordhorn (June 14, 1994)
(unpublished), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
188. "The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for
performance by the seller of his obligations." CISG, supra note 1, art. 47(1).
189. The Convention provides:
Unless the buyer has received notice from the seller that he will not
perform within the period so fixed, the buyer may not, during that pe-
riod, resort to any remedy for breach of contract. However, the buyer is
not deprived thereby of any right he may have to claim damages for
delay in performance.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 47(2).
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could not be found, or if the issue raised is one of the issues that
come under the "common core" of enforcement-related validity
issues, should the court refer to domestic law. Faithful adher-
ence to Article 7 requires this approach.
B. THE DEBATE OVER ARTICLES 14 AND 55(1)
Article 14 states that a proposal to conclude a contract is an
offer if it is sufficiently definite to allow the price to be fixed,
either explicitly or implicitly.190 Thus, if the price can be deter-
mined, the proposal does not fail for indefiniteness, and a valid
contract exists. Article 55 fills the gap for the price term and
states that, once a valid contract has been formed, the price is
the market price at the time of the conclusion of the contract. 191
Professor Farnsworth, applying the Convention language liter-
ally, argues that Article 55 applies only after the contract is val-
idly formed. 192 Because the Convention is not concerned with
the validity of the contract,' 93 its validity should be determined
according to the appropriate domestic law as directed by private
190. The Convention states:
A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific
persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates
the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance.
A proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly
or implicitly fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and
the price.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 14(1).
191. Article 55 states:
Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or
implicitly fix or make provision for determining the price, the parties
are considered, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, to have
impliedly made reference to the price generally charged at the time of
the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold under comparable
circumstances in the trade concerned.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 55(1).
192. Hartnell, supra note 180, at 69 n.276. Professor Hartnell also agrees
and states that "Article 14(1) is a rare example of the Convention itself declar-
ing that the absence of certain provisions renders a contract invalid." Id. at 69.
193. CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a).
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international law rules.'9 4 If such a contract is invalid under
domestic law, Article 55 cannot be applied. 195
While this argument is persuasive, it loses its strength
when the interaction between Article 14 and 55(1) is considered
in the international context. The Convention does not seem to
consider the missing price term to be fatal to the contract. The
Convention does not expressly provide a mechanism to fix a
missing quantity term or a term that identifies the goods (the
other two important variables under Article 14(2)), but Article
55 does provide the missing price. Thus, the view under the
Convention is that a contract is valid even if it does not have an
explicit price term. The price can be supplied either under Arti-
cle 14 (implicit or explicit provisions for fixing the price), or
under Article 8(3) (which allows for determination of the price
from any subsequent conduct of the parties), or ultimately under
Article 55(1) (a reasonable price).
Assume a scenario in which the parties failed to fix the price
under Article 14, the buyer nevertheless received the goods, and
the parties disagree on the price. The existence of the contract
can be proved under Article 8 from their conduct. But is there a
valid contract when the price term is missing? Under the indefi-
niteness argument, there is no contract, and Article 55 can not
be used if domestic law determines the contract to be invalid.
But the general principles of assessing the intent of the parties
from conduct, 196 protection of reasonable reiance, 197 and the
overarching principle of preservation of contract' 98 require the
194. The Convention states:
This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and
the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such
a contract. In particular, except as otherwise expressly provided in
this Convention, it is not concerned with: (a) the validity of the contract
or of any of its provisions or of any usage.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.
"The overall scheme is thus that the CISG (usually) provides the rules of
offer and acceptance; national law then determines whether there is a valid
(binding & enforceable) contract; whereafter CISG Part III regains control if
the answer is yes." Joseph M. Lookofsky, Loose Ends and Contorts in Interna-
tional Sales: Problems in the Harmonization of Private Law Rules, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 403, 405 (1991) (footnote omitted).
195. Extensive debate exists on the interaction between Articles 14 and
55(1). See generally Amato, supra note 16; Hartnell, supra note 180, at 69
n.276.
196. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8.
197. See supra notes 59 and 65 and accompanying text (discussing provi-
sions for reasonable reliance).
198. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing the principle
of contract preservation).
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contract to be preserved. Indeed, Article 55(1) is meant to apply
precisely to this type of situation. Only an overly-technical read-
ing, while ignoring the general scheme of the Convention, pro-
duces the result of an invalid contract under this scenario. 199
Thus, if the mandates of Article 7 are faithfully followed, the
term validity under the Convention should be given a narrow
interpretation limited to "common core" issues and does not
cover the issue of a missing price term.200
International case law is mixed on the validity aspect of
missing price terms. One court did not even inquire whether
missing price created a validity issue.20 1 The dispute was be-
tween an Italian seller and a French buyer who contracted over
the sale of sweets produced by the seller. When the seller sued
for the buyer's default in payment, the buyer claimed that the
price was not fixed in the contract and that the price was to be
determined according to Article 55. The buyer thus argued that
the price should be the market price, which was less than the
price when the contract was concluded. The court held that the
buyer had taken delivery of the goods without contesting the
price indicated by the seller. Under Article 8(2) and 8(3), such
conduct should be interpreted as acceptance of the price. One
lower court in Hungary determined that the quality, quantity,
and price of the goods were all impliedly fixed by practices which
the parties had established between themselves over a period of
time.202
The Hungarian Supreme Court, in Pratt & Whitney v.
Malev, The Hungarian Airlines,203 ruled that if the price can not
199. "[I]n a codified set of rules such as the Convention, every effort should
be made to construe seemingly incompatible provisions in order to make sense
out of them." Garro, supra note 185, at 464.
200. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing the core of valid-
ity issues).
201. Case 213 (Italy v. F.R.G.), Entreprise Alain VEYRON v. Soci,t, E. AM-
BROSIO, Cour d'Appel de Grenoble Chambre Commerciale (Apr. 26, 1995) (ab-
stract) (unpublished), available in UNILEX, supra note 3.
202. Case AZ 12.G.41.471/1991 (F.R.G. v. Hung.), Metropolitan Court of Bu-
dapest (Mar. 24, 1992) (abstract) (unpublished), available in UNILEX, supra
note 3. The court found that the contract did not fail for indefiniteness because
the German seller repeatedly delivered the same type of goods and the Hun-
garian buyer paid the price after each such delivery. Id. Thus, Article 9(1) of
the CISG was applicable to determine the "validity" of the contract for Article
14(1) purposes.
203. Case Gf. I. 31 349/1992/9 (U.S. v. Hung.), United Technologies Interna-
tional, Pratt & Whitney v. MALEV Hungarian Airlines, The Supreme Court of
the Replublic of Hungary (Sept. 25, 1992) (unpublished), available in UNILEX,
supra note 3, translated in 13 J.L. & COM. 31 (1993).
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be determined from the contract, the contract is void. Pratt &
Whitney, a U.S. aircraft engine manufacturer, and the Hun-
garian Airlines (Malev) had entered into an agreement for
Malev to purchase certain aircraft engines to be chosen in the
future. The price had been agreed upon for two engines, but it
was not fixed for one other engine. Malev argued that there was
no price agreed upon for the third engine and that the contract
failed for indefiniteness under Article 14(1). The Malev court
reasoned that "price is an essential term" of the contract and
ruled that the contract failed when the price could not be deter-
mined from the contract. The Court stated that there was no
"ready market" for aircraft engines and that the price could not
be fixed by using Article 55.
The Malev Court was short on analysis and failed to pay
attention to the Convention on many fronts. The Court hastily
referred to domestic law by failing to interpret the term "valid-
ity" under the Convention. In the process the Court ignored the
interrelationship between Article 55 and Article 14. The Court
purported to be willing to apply Article 55, but paid it only lip
service when the Court stated that there was no ready market
for aircraft engines and that the price could not be determined.
Even though an aircraft engine is not a common commodity,
there could have been an acceptable method to fix the price: for
example, by an independent appraiser familiar with the aircraft
engine industry. The Court did not take into account the par-
ties' intent under Article 8 in the formation of the contract. The
parties' behavior, under an objective standard of either Article
8(2) or 8(3), revealed that the parties considered themselves to
have a binding agreement. Finally, the Court missed the gen-
eral principle of protecting the reasonable reliance of the ag-
grieved party.20 4 The facts in Malev seem to indicate that Pratt
& Whitney reasonably believed that a binding contract was
formed. The Malev decision suggests that not only Malev, but
also the Court failed to observe "good faith" under the Conven-
tion. The Malev decision should have questionable authority in
the international jurisprudence of the Convention.
V. CONCLUSION
The international delegates to the Vienna Convention nego-
tiated and compromised to the best of their abilities with one
204. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing general principles
and the specific textual provisions supporting the general principle of protection
of reasonable reliance).
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major objective: to bring uniformity and certainty to the interna-
tional trade regime. The regime they envisioned is based on an
international interpretation which is free from any domestic ties
so that the international trader can rely on it without having to
be concerned with parochial biases and idiosyncrasies stemming
from the trading partner's domestic legal system. While global
trade truly has become an international phenomenon, the legal
system that is supposed to assist such trade has not kept pace.
Many courts today still interpret the Convention without any re-
gard or consideration for its international character. They re-
sort to domestic law without hesitation. The Article 7
requirement of good faith can be met only if the judiciary pays
attention to decisions from other jurisdictions, as well as to
the general principles and fundamental objectives of the
Convention.
This article demonstrates that reference to the general prin-
ciples of the Convention will greatly reduce the need to resort to
domestic law in resolving many issues that may arise in interna-
tional trade. It proposes that courts follow this international ap-
proach by extracting general principles from the Convention.
While the Convention does not explicitly impose an obligation of
good faith on the parties, many of the Convention's general prin-
ciples operate collectively to create such an obligation. Requir-
ing good faith as a general principle promotes trust and
confidence in the Convention as an international body of trade
law. The general principles approach also permits a narrow in-
terpretation of the concept of validity, reducing reference to do-
mestic law on issues that the Convention should govern.
Interpretations based on general principles thus more fully ef-
fectuate the goals of the Convention.
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